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The idea that subjective well-being can serve as a measure of individual welfare has led to
a revival of Bentham’s conception of utility: “that property in any object, whereby it tends to
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (...)”1. Some argue that subjective well-
being is a better measure of utility than choices because, it measures experienced utility rather
than decision utility [Daniel Kahneman and Sarin(1997)].2 The use of subjective well-being as a
proxy for utility shows great promise for economics but also raises important questions about
governmental policies and individual well-being. Consequently, happiness research is becoming
increasingly popular in the media.
I refer throughout to the “equivalence assumption”, a term meant to capture the conceptual
equivalence of well-being and utility. The methodological implication of this assumption is that
self-rated survey items about peoples’ hedonic states are informative of their economic welfare.
Assuming reliable information implies that researchers can rely on what individuals say and not
solely on what they do. This departs from the traditional methodology by which economists
gather information. As many of the concepts discussed in this text appear closely related to one
another, the following explains the theoretical distinctions amongst them.
Throughout this dissertation, the use of the terms happiness and life-satisfaction refers to
1The term Well-Being is used to refer to both Happiness and Life Satisfaction as measured by questionnaire items such as
the ones presented later in this text.
2Kahneman and al. argue that there is a difference between decision utility, what drives people to make choices, and
experienced utility, the actual utility attained by these choices.
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“what is measured by subjective well-being survey items”, as opposed to abstract philosophi-
cal concepts open to interpretation. Subjective well-being is simply a way of referring to both
measures simultaneously.
Happiness can be defined as the “overall goodness or badness of an individual’s felt experience
at any point in time”. Underlying this is the presumption that well-being is a hedonic state which
results from seeking pleasure and avoiding pain. A less narrow definition of the concept refers
to the fulfilment of ones human potential, also referred to as psychological well-being [Bruni and
Porta()].
More specific conceptions include Kimbal and Willis’s [Kimball and Willis(2005)] definition of
happiness as the sum of two components: elation –or short-run happiness– and base-line mood
–or long-run happiness–. High frequency measures of well-being capture the evolution of elation,
the reaction to new information about life-time utility3 [Miles Kimball and Tsutsui(2006)] . Low-
frequency happiness measures reflect long-run happiness, a sub-utility function much like health,
entertainment or nutrition.
Life satisfaction measures something slightly different than happiness in that it implicitly asks
individuals to make comparisons. Satisfaction is by definition a relative concept. When a respon-
dent is asked how satisfied she is with her life, she is asked to compare her circumstance with an
unspecified benchmark.
Utility is the concept used in economics to represent an agent’s preferences into a tractable
object. It is what agents maximize when making decisions, i.e. when choosing between options.
Behavioral economists sometimes draw a distinction between two types of utility. The fact that
individuals often make mistakes has prompted some to argue that a distinction should be made
between decision and experienced utility. “Decision utility is the weight of an outcome in a de-
cision. Experienced utility is hedonic quality, as in Bentham’s usage” [Daniel Kahneman and
Sarin(1997)].
Finally, welfare is also frequently employed in the field. Its meaning is typically context de-
3See Kimball, Levy, Ohtake and Tsutsui for an example of the use of weekly happiness data to understand the effect of
the Katrina hurricane.
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pendent. In the context of standard economics, welfare simply refers to utility (generally to the
utility of many agents). If one were to draw a distinction between decision and experienced utility,
“welfare”, as commonly used, would equate to experienced utility. In that sense, many happiness
researchers equate subjective well-being with welfare and experienced utility and revealed pref-
erence with decision utility.
Even if it does not measure utility, understanding the determinants of well-being is important.
Uncovering the shape of the “long-run happiness function” would inform policy makers about
the demand of a good which is undoubtedly a very-important determinant of welfare.
Views on the relevance of happiness research for Economics vary a great deal. Generally speak-
ing, most economists then to be wary of the method. Unfortunately, little research is conducted on
the method per se; the assumption of equivalence between happiness and utility is typically either
accepted or rejected but it is rarely tested. This dissertation intends to remediate this by providing
grounds for a critical review of the literature in the field of happiness economics.
Chapter II, entitled “The Functional Form of Happiness”, provides an empirical test of the no-
tion that the lack of growth in aggregate happiness in the US despite a massive rise in GDP per
capita can be explained by the mechanisms of income adaptation and social comparison. This in-
terpretation of the Easterlin paradox has led some to conclude that economic growth should not
be an objective of modern governments. The analysis in the chapter shows how the assumption
of equivalence has led many researchers to interpret the so-called stylized facts of happiness as
evidence that people perfectly adapt to income changes. More importantly, the text demonstrates
that this interpretation is flawed as it is not supported by microeconomic analysis. Social compar-
ison is also rejected as a satisfactory solution to the happiness income puzzle on the grounds that
the comparisons that people make are physically close to them which, taken alone, is incompat-
ible with the stylized fact that citizens in richer countries tend to be happier. The argumentation
presented in the chapter leads to the conclusion that income inequality plays a crucial role in the
conversion of economic growth into general happiness, the focus of the second chapter.
Chapter III, entitled “Happiness and Income Inequality” explores the importance of income
inequality for general well-being. The chapter documents the simultaneous increase of both the
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income and happiness gaps between the rich and the poor over the last three decades. The anal-
ysis shows that this pattern of economic growth with no increase in average happiness is not
inconsistent with agents whose preferences are typical that they do not exhibit adaptation or so-
cial comparison. The concavity of the happiness function is crucial to the argument. The chapter
also explores and rejects the possibility that the paradox is a result of a measurement error of the
income variable.
Chapter IV, entitled “Time, Gender and Happiness” argues in favor of interpreting subjective
well-being as a good while proposing a framework for happiness research and the interpretation
of subjective well-being regressions. The paper documents the life-cycle differences in happiness
measures of men and women and the importance of both time spent working and work status for
individual well-being. The capacity of these gender differences to explain the absolute and relative
decline of women happiness in the US is tested. The analysis reveals that while women tend to
be happier than men during youth, the reverse is true after retirement. The happiness of men
and women also differs with respect to the effects of time spent working and work status. One of
the elements to emerge is that work status is a less important factor in a woman’s happiness than
a man’s; an interpretation is proposed. Although the analysis finds mixed evidence that gender
specific factors can explain the reversal of the gender happiness gap, the results support the notion
that happiness is a good and that its production is time-intensive.
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CHAPTER II
The Functional Form of Happiness
2.1 Introduction
The use of subjective well-being (SWB) as a proxy for utility has grown in popularity. This is
in part due to the growing concern that revealed preferences measure decision utility rather than
experienced utility. Experienced utility is the relevant concept for policy making and happiness
researchers believe that subjective well-being is a better measure of it. Validating this assump-
tion, however, is a complex task. Finding utility functions capable of mimicking the behavior
of SWB and its puzzling relationship to income is crucial in demonstrating that SWB measures
welfare. This is one of the reason so much attention has been given to the study of happiness
functions. Many have concluded that functions that exhibit income adaptation and social com-
parison can solve the famous happiness income puzzle [Ed Diener and Diener(1992)], [Easter-
lin(2001)], [Stutzer(2004)]. In the words of Clark and Shields income adaptation and social com-
parisons can “easily explain the Easterlin Paradox” [Andrew E. Clark and Shields(2008)].
This paper shows that although utility functions which reconcile growing GDP with flat av-
erage happiness exist some of the preferences implied by these functions fail empirical tests at
the microeconomic level. Many of the models of utility proposed in the happiness literature as
solutions to the Easterlin paradox cannot replicate all of the features of the relationship between
income and subjective well-being. The analysis in this paper leads to the conclusion that inferences
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made from macroeconomic aggregations of subjective well-being are inconsistent with microeco-
nomic analysis and that these so-called solutions are incomplete. Stated differently, conclusions
about peoples’ preferences based on interpretations of the happiness income puzzle, such as the
notion that income growth does not raise individual happiness, are flawed.
Under the income adaptation conjecture, utility functions capable of converting a growing
GDP into flat utility flows exhibit extremely high levels of adaptation, empirically unobserved at
the microeconomic level. Under the social comparison conjecture, amongst GDP, World GDP and
average regional income, the only reference group to receive empirical support is regional income.
Although functions that represent the preferences of agents who compare their income with the
average income in their region are capable of replicating the lack of growth in aggregate happiness,
they do not explain why richer countries tend to be happier then poorer ones. Because they offer
some of the best available data and both exhibit the pattern of rising GDP and non-growing well-
being, the paper focuses on Germany and the United-States.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 summarizes the relevant literature and presents
a description of the stylized facts of the relationship between income and well-being that form the
Easterlin Paradox (2.2.1). More specifically, Section 2.2.2 describes how income adaptation (2.2.2)
and social comparison (2.2.2) explain the happiness-income puzzle. Section 2.3 presents a formal
model of the two mechanism. The model serves as the foundation of the empirical strategy (Sec-
tion 2.4) for the analysis in Section 2.5. The data is described in Section 4.3. Section 2.6 discusses
some implications and limitations of the paper and Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Background
The SWB method relies on an individual’s capacity to assess her own feelings of happiness
and satisfaction with life and builds on the assumption that subjective well-being is conceptually
and empirically equivalent to utility. The consensus among happiness researchers is that “happi-
ness scores measure true internal utility” [DiTella and MacCulloch(2006)] and that “measures of
subjective well-being can (...) serve as proxies for utility” [Frey and Stutzer(2002)]. Richard East-
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erlin, for example, takes “the terms well-being, utility, happiness, life satisfaction and welfare to
be interchangeable” [Easterlin(2005)].
One of the appeals of the SWB approach is that it offers the possibility of exploring questions
which have remained without answers due to a lack of behavioral evidence. Happiness and life-
satisfaction questions have been used, among other things, to value non-traded goods [Rafeal
Di Tella and MacCulloch(2004)], life events [Miles Kimball and Tsutsui(2006)] and macroeco-
nomic circumstances [Rafael DiTella and Oswald(2001)]. Well-being research can provide policy-
makers with valuable information about individual welfare, especially in the event that prefer-
ences are inconsistent or lead to sub-optimal behavior [Oswald(1997)], [Easterlin(2001)], [Frey and
Stutzer(2002)], [Kimball and Willis(2005)]. However, while happiness behaves in many regards
as economists would expect utility to behave, the equivalence between subjective well-being and
welfare has yet to be formally established. If SWB does not measure utility, its use as a policy tool
could be misguided.
2.2.1 The Easterlin Paradox
Of special interest to happiness researchers is the relationship between well-being and income.
Over the last few decades, studies have uncovered a series of stylized facts that appear to be
inconsistent. Succinctly put, although richer people are happier and richer countries have happier
citizens, increases in average income over time do not appear to lead to corresponding increases
in average happiness [Oswald(1997)], [Frey and Stutzer(2002)]. Because he was one of the first
to highlight this inconsistency, these puzzling facts have taken his name and are often referred to
collectively as the Easterlin paradox [Easterlin(1974)].
Irrespective of time or place, analyses of individual cross-sections systematically find that peo-
ple with higher income are happier (Fact 1) [Frey and Stutzer(2002)]. Figure 2.7 plots superim-
posed cross sections of subjective well-being and real income for the US and Germany, with data
aggregated by income group.1 This relationship between well-being and income is concave and
the log-linear function appropriately capture its degree of curvature [Rousseau(2009)].
1The income group are the income category in the questionnaire for the GSS and groups of 5 percentile for the GSOEP.
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A similar finding is that on average richer nations have happier citizens (Fact 2). Figure 2.2
plots the income and standardized levels of happiness for different countries that took part in
the fourth wave of the World Values Survey. The nature of the relationship between income and
individual well-being is somewhat different than the relationship between GDP and national well-
being. The former is more concave than the latter as the trend lines on the graphic suggest.
What is puzzling about the relationship between income and well-being comes from the fact
that although they are positively related to one another in the cross-section, in many countries,
there is no significant increase in average well-being despite substantial increases in average real
income (Fact 3). Figure 2.3 plots the time series of average subjective well-being for the US and
Germany against real GDP per capita. The scales have been chosen to highlight two miscon-
ceptions about well-being across time. Firstly, although it is often said that happiness is “flat”,
aggregate well-being is not stagnant over time; it is a rather volatile flow. Secondly, the most ac-
curate description of the time trend of aggregate well-being is that there is nothing stylized about
it. In some countries, such as Germany, the available data suggests not only a lack of growth but
a real decline.2 Stevenson and Wolfers observed that the lack of growth in average well-being
is not present in every country. In some nations such as Italy or Denmark (as identified in the
Eurobarometer), economic growth has been accompanied with a rise in average subjective well-
being [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)].
In another paper, I document the widening of the happiness gap between the richest and poor-
est quintile in developed countries, where average income has grown in the last half of the twen-
tieth century [Rousseau(2009)]. The top two graphics of Figure 2.4 plot the evolution of average
subjective well-being of income quitiles in the US and Germany. The middle graphics highlight
the evolution of the rich-poor happiness gap (black dashed line), while the bottom graphics plot
the evolution of real income for these groups. In the US, for example, the happiness difference
between the bottom 20% poorest and the top 20% richest is 25% larger in 2003 then it was in 1975.
Since this phenomena qualifies the evolution of happiness across the income distribution it should
2A linear regression of life satisfaction on time estimates a decline of roughly 0.4 of a standard deviation between 1984
and 2004.
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be considered a stylized feature of the relationship between income and happiness.3
Stylized Facts
Fact 1 Log-linear relation between individual income and subjective well-being
Fact 2 Positive relationship between national SWB and GDP per capita
Fact 3 Negative/Flat/Positive relationship between economic growth and national SWB
Fact 4 Widening of the rich-poor happiness gap in economically developed countries
Regardless of whether the lack of evidence of serial correlation between income and happiness
has been incorrectly interpreted as a lack of correlation (as Stevenson and Wolfers have sug-
gested [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]), many have interpreted the puzzle as evidence that con-
ventional conceptions of utility functions need to be revisited. The most commonly proposed
modification is the inclusion of the income adaptation and social comparison mechanisms. The
insights behind these two phenomena stem from research showing that individual happiness is
negatively affected by past own income and neighbor’s current income [Rafeal Di Tella and Mac-
Culloch(2004)] [Luttmer(2004)]. If they truly are “solutions” to the Easterlin paradox, happiness
functions of adaptation and comparison should be able to replicate all of the stylized facts enu-
merated above. The aim of this paper is to test whether this is indeed the case.
2.2.2 Interpreting the Easterlin Paradox
Many interpretations have been given to the inconsistent stylized facts about the relationship
between income and happiness. Aside from the income adaptation and social comparison solu-
tions, researchers have explored the possibility that survey items improperly measure SWB, that
SWB measures something other than contemporaneous utility, and that variables have been omit-
ted from the analysis.
One possible explanation is that surveys do not accurately measure happiness, and conse-
quently utility. This explanation is typically rejected on the grounds that happiness items are cor-
3These estimates are obtained with an ordered probit of happiness on a set of binary variables of membership to the
bottom, mid and top quintiles and interaction of these variables with time as well as sociodemographic controls.
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related with other indicators of mood, such as the frequency at which individuals smile and frown,
the assessment of individual’s emotional state by external judges and frontal brain activity [Shiz-
gal(2000)] [Diener and Lucas(1999)] [Fox and Davidson(1988)]. In the language of psychologists,
subjective well-being measures are internally valid.
Another possible reason for the lack of serial correlation between individual happiness and
income is that happiness measures life-time utility rather than contemporaneous utility. Since
life-time utility is forward looking, expected income changes are accounted for in advance. If
happiness measured life-time utility, it would only fluctuate with unexpected changes in circum-
stances and therefore would exhibit no positive time trend in the absence of such changes. Under
this conjecture, richer individuals would be happier because their expected income is higher. This
assumption, however, must be rejected because it fails to explain the lack of a positive time trend
at the national level, which is observed in some countries. Indeed, if happiness measured life-time
utility, average happiness would have reflected the growth in average life-time income in the US
over the last decades. 4
Researchers have also considered the possibility that the Paradox stems from the omission of
key determinants of well-being from empirical studies. Although little work has been done to
test this hypothesis, the idea is generally rejected on the grounds that consumption goods, health-
care and living conditions in general, things that are presumed to be important for happiness,
have improved over the last century [DiTella and MacCulloch(2005)]. More recently, researchers
have begun to investigate the role of “social capital” variables, such as trust and the quality of
government. Although it is not the focus of this paper, it appears that accounting for these fac-
tors could shed new light on the Easterlin paradox [Helliwell and Putnam(2004)], [Helliwell and
Huang(2005)], [S. Bartolini and Pugno(2007)], [Biancotti and D’Alessio(2007)].
Another explanation that has been presented is the that people do not spend their money on
what makes them happy. Frank (2004), for example, highlights the fact that many people choose to
live in the suburbs in order to have roomier houses even tough the well-being gains from increased
4The expected life-time income of the average citizen grows over time has the composition of the population changes.
Ceteris paribus, newborns have a greater expected income in 2009 then they did in 1975.
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square footage are inferior to the losses incurred from commuting to work every day [Frank(2004)].
The observation that individuals do not maximize SWB is consistent with the idea that agents are
irrational, but even more so with the idea that SWB is not what agents maximize.
The simplest explanation of the the Easterlin paradox is that subjective well-being and utility
are not equivalent [Kimball and Willis(2005)]. Happiness, or affect, “defined as the overall good-
ness or badness of an individual’s felt experience at any point in time” is the sum of two compo-
nents: elation –short-run happiness– and base-line mood –long-run happiness–. High frequency
measures of well-being capture the evolution of elation, the reaction to new information about life-
time utility5. Low-frequency happiness items reflect long-run happiness, a high-order good much
like health, entertainment or nutrition. The conception of happiness and utility as being different is
consistent, for example, with behavior models in which utility reflects preferences emerging from
evolution while happiness is a more transitory object. In this context, maximizing utility means
something very different than maximizing happiness. It implies that agents can behave in a way
that makes them unhappy but maximizes their utility. This interpretation of the Easterlin paradox
does not imply that the study of happiness and life satisfaction is pointless, rather that such stud-
ies inform us about the shape of the production function of long-run happiness (base-line mood),
an important determinants of welfare. Under this conjecture, happiness flows are interpreted as
reflecting consumption patterns. Chapter IV explores this idea in greater detail by investigating
gender differences with regards to the importance of time and time allocation for happiness.
Finally, the most widely accepted solutions to the Easterlin Paradox are the psychological
mechanism of income adaptation and social comparison [Easterlin(1974)]), [Stutzer(2004)], [An-
drew E. Clark and Shields(2008)]. These concepts refer to the idea that individuals make relative
judgments. Income adaptation captures the fact that individuals compare their circumstances with
past ones while social comparison captures the fact that individuals compare their circumstances
with that of others. As they are the focus of this paper, these explanations are presented in greater
detail.
5See Kimball, Levy, Ohtake and Tsutsui [Miles Kimball and Tsutsui(2006)] for an example of the use of weekly happiness
data to understand the effect of the Katrina hurricane.
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Income Adaptation
Hedonic adaptation is defined as “any action, process, or mechanism that reduces the effects of
a constant or repeated stimulus” [Frederick and Loewenstein(1999)]. In economic terms hedonic
adaptation implies that the extra utility from additional income (goods, health, air quality, leisure
...) declines over time. Individuals get accustomed to improvements in their circumstances. This
notion implies non-static preferences in the sense that the very act of consuming a good lowers its
marginal utility.
The expressions “hedonic adaptation”, “income adaptation”, “aspiration level” and “internal
habits” are sometimes used interchangeably in the happiness literature. Kimball and Willis dis-
tinguish hedonic adaptation from internal habits [Kimball and Willis(2005)]. While the former
concept describes the behavior of elation, a rapidly mean reverting component of affect, the latter
captures the idea that individuals get disutility from getting less than they are accustomed to (as
predicted by their habit stock). When compared to the length of time necessary for someone to
process day-to-day information, income adaptation is rather slow [Kimball and Silverman(2008)].
The model presented in the next section is therefore closer in spirit to internal habits as defined by
economists than hedonic adaptation as defined by psychologists. Note however that this distinc-
tion is seldom made, partly because of the low availability of high frequency data.
Although there exists a plethora of evidence supporting the notion that individuals adapt (in
the hedonic sense) to changing circumstances, few provide micro level evidence of adaptation
to income specifically. The most commonly cited study is one by Brickman, Coates and Janoff-
Bulman who found that, compared to a control group, lottery winners reported only slight in-
creases in their levels of life-satisfaction in the year following their windfall [Brickman and Kil-
mann(1978)]. More recently, DiTella, Haisken-De New and MacCulloch found empirical evidence
of adaptation to income using data from the German Socio Economic Panel [Rafeal Di Tella and
MacCulloch(2004)]. They fond that 65% of the initial positive impact of an income gain disappears
within four years. Studying lottery winners in Britain, Gardner and Oswald (2006) fond mixed
evidence of adaptation to income [Gardner and Oswald(2007)]. Their work suggests that traces of
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increased well-being persist beyond the second year following an unexpected income windfall.
Agents who compare their current and previous income care about changes in income, there-
fore a steadily increasing income can be converted into a steady happiness flow (Fact 3).6 Happi-
ness decreases when income falls below its historic level and conversely increases when it grows
beyond its historic level. In this context, the happiness gap between rich and poor (Fact 1) and be-
tween wealthy and developing nations (Fact 2) is a result of discrepancies in income growth rates.
The same is true about the evolution of happiness gap over time (Fact 4). The income adaptation
hypothesis does not rule out the possibility that countries with similar average income growth
rates rank differently on happiness scales. Since country-level data comes from the aggregation of
individual data, the distribution of income can play a role in the conversion of economic growth
into national happiness.
Social Comparison
Empirical evidence suggesting a negative correlation between happiness and neighbor’s in-
come lend validity to social comparison as another explanation to the Easterlin paradox [Luttmer(2004)].
The idea that individuals compare themselves with others is not new; it was first introduced by
Veblen in 1899 and later discussed by Duesenberry in 1949 [Veblen(1994)] [Duesenberry(1949)].
If preferences exhibit social comparison richer people are happier because comparisons with
others benefit them (Fact 1). Average happiness remains constant over time if, as everyone gets
wealthier, relative incomes remain the same (Fact 3). Social comparisons can generate a positive
relationship between GDP and SWB in country level cross sections (Fact 2) if agents compare
each other across borders. Whether comparisons generate a widening income gap depends on the
evolution of the income distribution within a country over time (Fact 4).
6Although most models of utility are framed in terms of consumption and not income, happiness research as studied
income. Although this is mainly because of data limitation, some have argued that income better reflects individuals’
status, conceived to be an important determinant of happiness.
13
Aspirations
Easterlin’s formulation of the mechanisms of adaptation and comparison builds on the concept
of aspirations [Easterlin(2001)]. Aspirations reflect the level of income an agent deems necessary
(sufficient, good...) to be happy (somewhat happy, very happy ...). When aspirations are formed
with reference to past circumstances, agents’ preference are adaptative; when they are formed on
the basis of others’ income, they are comparative. Easterlin explains that aspirations can depend
on both past income and others’ income. Just as with adaptation, current income gains have the
negative effect of raising future aspirations; the level of income needed to elicit the same affective
response in the next period thus rises with current income. As income grows, preferences drift
over time [Stutzer(2004)].
2.3 A Model of Adaptation and Social Comparison
This section develops a framework for the empirical analysis that encompasses many specifica-
tions of the adaptation and comparison mechanism. Many formulations of these preferences have
been studied, some of which are presented in Table 2.1 [Rafeal Di Tella and MacCulloch(2004)],
[Stutzer(2004)], [Luttmer(2004)], [Dynan and Ravina(2007)], [Vendrick and Woltjer(2007)]. Every
formulation relies on the log-linear form to capture the concavity of the relationship between in-
come and well-being. The other functional assumption shared by all of the models is that the
comparison between own income and reference income takes the form of a ratio. Although the
studies vary quite a bit in terms of defining a reference point, they rely on similar mechanics. The
following section makes this explicit.
The model is an extension of Abel (1990) and Grishchenko (2005) [Abel(1990)] [Grishchenko(2005)].
Since the purpose of this paper is to assess the implications of the assumption of equivalence be-
tween utility and well-being, the terminology used to describe the model does not distinguish the
two concepts. The presentation of the model should highlight the way in which researchers have
made inferences about individual preferences on the basis of reduced form regressions. Indeed,
much of the empirical work on happiness has been interpreted as being informative about the
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shape of an underlying utility function.
2.3.1 Model
The agent’s utility depends on the discrepancy between her income (yit) and a reference income






where β is the discount factor and zjt is reference income. This definition of reference income is
slightly different than a comparison between own and others’ income [Dynan and Ravina(2007)].
Here, zjt is solely the element with which the comparison is done. It can be specified to reflect the











In the adaptation formulation, Equation (2), reference income is made of a combination of own
incomes (yt−1,...) from the past ρ periods. The parameter ρ indexes the persistence of habit forma-
tion. When ρ = 0, only last period’s income enters the utility function. For values of ρ > 0, a higher
ρ means that more incomes from a distant past enter the agent’s utility function. For simplicity,
each past income (m) enters the function with its own weight, γm.7
In the social comparison formulation, , Equation (3), reference income, Yjt, is the income of the
groups with which the agent compares herself. In a manner similar to the adaptation version of the
model, different reference groups can compose the reference income of the agent, each with their
own weight γj . Social comparison models typically assume no persistence in reference income.






The contemporaneous utility function takes the following form.








where A is the scaling parameter, providing the ratio at which income and reference income are
converted into well-being. B is an intercept term that reflects the fact that factors out of the agent’s
control, such has her personality and gender, influence her well-being. z̃t is the linearized reference
income. The second term is thus the weighted (γm or γj) sum of past or reference groups’ incomes.
The parameter γ captures the degree of separability of the utility function and is the parameter of
interest in the analysis. Also, it should be noted that the model is specified in a way such that γ
is positive. With this formulation, a negative γ reflects the preferences of an agent who is made
better-off when past income or the income of the reference group rises. Whether a growing income
is converted into a steady happiness flow or whether generalized income gains leave unaffected
the average well-being depends on the value of the γs. Observe that this formulation corresponds
to the isoelastic form with a coefficient of relative risk aversion equal to one.8.
It should be clear that Equation (2.4) does not rule out the possibility that the agent cares about
both her income level (L) and how it relates to reference income (R), or relative income. Rearrang-
ing the terms makes this explicit.




γL = A(1− γ) γR = Aγ
Equation (2.4) also highlights how the γ coefficient can be estimated using linear regressions. This
equation is the backbone of almost every specification used in studies of subjective well-being.
Hopefully, the formalization shows how different specifications can be compared but more impor-
tantly, how their capacity to emulate happiness flows hinges on the same mechanics: the degree
of separability. For that reason, throughout the paper, the econometric results will be presented in







terms of the degree of separability of the function γ throughout the paper.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
The objective of the analysis is to show that merely designing functions that solve the East-
erlin paradox is of limited use when the exercise is not grounded in microeconomic data. More
precisely, the analysis shows that some of the models put forward as solutions to the happiness
income puzzle fail to receive empirical validation. For both the income adaptation model and the
social comparison model, the analysis begins with a comparison of the level of separability in-
ferred from aggregate data (or simply hypothesized in the literature) with the one obtained using
micro-level analysis. When the model passes this initial test, the models’ ability to replicate the
empirical features of the relationship between income and well-being, i.e. Facts 1 through 4, is
evaluated.
2.4.1 Income Adaptation
The idea that economic growth should not be a goal of governmental policies stems from the
interpretation of figures such as Figure 2.3 as evidence that individuals fully adapt to changes in
income, i.e. γ = 1. This conclusion emerges when equations like Equation (2.4) are estimated with
aggregate data as if the economy as a whole was representative of a single agent. To verify the
appropriateness of this approach, the following two equations are estimated and compared.
SWBjt = α + β ln(Yjt) + δ1 ln(Yjt−1) + ...+ δm ln(Yijt−n) + εitj(2.5)
SWBijt = α + β ln(yijt) + δ1 ln(yijt−1) + ...+ δm ln(yijt−n)(2.6)
+ X ′λk + φij + εitj
Equation (2.5) relates average national well-being (SWBjt) to average GDP per capita (Yjt). Equa-
tion (2.6) relates individual well-being (SWBijt) to individual income (yijt). In Equation 2.6, X is
a vector of individual characteristics that includes the respondent’s age and its square, his ethnic-
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ity, gender, religion, employment status, number of children in his household and marital status.
The vector φ is a vector of individual fixed effects included whenever the data permits. Because
the GSS is not a panel, the analysis of the adaptation model involves the transformation of the
cross-sections into a pseudo-panel of income quintiles, taken to reflect the income and happiness
of representative agents in each income group. More precisely, the analysis is conducted with the
average residual happiness of the income quintile from a first stage regression of happiness on the
individual characteristics in X . Doing so lowers the number of observations to five per year. Both
equations generate estimates of γ̂ that can be obtained by taking the ratio of the lagged income
and current income coefficients, equivalent to taking the ratio of A to Aγ in Equation (2.4).
Adaptation: γ̂m = −δ̂m/β̂(2.7)
The estimate obtained with Equation (2.5) are compared to those obtained with Equation (2.6).
2.4.2 Social Comparison
The lack of serial correlation between aggregate well-being and economic growth has also of-
ten been seen as evidence that individuals care solely about their relative position on the income
ladder. Some suggest that economic growth actually leaves people worse-off.9 Of the many ex-
isting specifications of the reference group, the analysis will focus on the World’s GDP, GDP in
the respondent’s country and the average income in the agent’s region as candidate reference in-
comes. The analysis starts by asking whether individual well-being does indeed respond to these
candidate reference incomes by estimating the following equation.
SWBijt = α + β ln(yijt) + η ln(Yjt) + X ′λk + φij + εitj(2.8)
The coefficients and variables are the same as previously described with the exception of reference
income, Yjt. The focus of the analysis is once again the separability parameter. According to the
9Average happiness decreases in the face of widespread income gains when the negative externality of ones income for
others’ happiness is larger than the own effect.
18
model, η will be negative, and consequently γ will be positive, if individuals derive well-being
from having more income than the reference point. As previously explained, γ is obtained by
taking the ratio of the own income and the reference income coefficients.
Comparison: γ̂j = −η̂j/β̂ if ρ = 0(2.9)
The estimated γ can be compared to what the literature suggests, permitting assessment of the
empirical foundation of each of the three reference income candidates. A discussion of the capacity
of the models that find empirical support to replicate the other stylized facts follows.
2.4.3 Data
Recent work suggest that the Easterlin paradox could be an isolated American phenomenon
[Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]. For that reason, the analysis concentrates on countries with an
unambiguous pattern of positive economic growth and no improvement in average well-being:
the US and Germany.
Two sources of data are used for the analysis. The General Social Survey (GSS) is a repeated
micro-level cross section of about 1600 Americans covering the years 1972 to 2006 (with some
gaps). The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a yearly panel of about 2750 German adults.
The GSOEP contains detailed socioeconomic information as well as a life satisfaction measure
over a period ranging from 1984 to 2005. Two other sources were used to generate graphics: the
World Values Survey (WVS), a repeated cross-section of roughly 5000 respondents from different
countries in the world, and the Eurobarometer (EB), a repeated cross-section of anywhere between
450 and 4250 respondents (averaging at about 1600) from different European nations, including
Germany, from 1974 to 2004. The same countries are typically sampled annually with additional
countries added over time.
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Well-Being
Table 2.2 reports the questionnaire items used to measure subjective well-being in each of the
surveys. The table also reports the average and standard deviation obtained when equally spaced
numerical values are attributed to each of the item answers. Because the questions are different
for each survey, when displaying data graphically, Stevenson and Wolfers method for aggregating
well-being scores across groups is used [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]. The idea is to report
the coefficients from ordered probit regressions of subjective well-being on group dummies (with
no other controls) as the average well-being for that group. The coefficients reported should be
interpreted as well-being indices that capture shifts in an underlying normally distributed latent
well-being variable. Unless otherwise specified, the ordered probits are estimated on the whole
sample (all years, countries, etc.). Depending on the grouping variables used, the procedure allows
for different levels of aggregation.
Income
Table 2.3 presents the details of the questionnaire items used to collect the information about
respondents’ income. The GSOEP is the only source of data offering non-categorical income mea-
sures. The GSS and the EB rely on roughly 5 to 15 income categories per country-wave; for these
surveys the income variable is converted into a numerical figure by assigning to it values that cor-
respond to the mid-point of the income categories chosen by the respondent. The highest income
bracket is converted by adding half of the distance between the top and bottom bounds of the pre-
vious category to the lowest bound of the top category.10 For most surveys, the income categories
do not change annually but do so at least every five years, which is relatively frequent.
GDP per capita, World GDP per capita and CPI, used to convert nominal into real figures,
come from the World Penn Tables [of Pennsilvanya(2007)] or the OECD web site [OECD(2007)].
When the analysis uses regional income, the figure represent an aggregation of the respondent’s
income for each of nine regions in the GSS and fifteen regions in the GSOEP. The GSS provides
10For example, if the previous to last category is $45,000 to $55,000 and the top category is $55,001 and up, the numerical
figure attributed to respondents that chose the top income category is $60,000.
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information about each respondent’s regions (e.g., New-England, Atlantic, etc.) The GSOEP’s
regions are somewhat geographically smaller and include Berlin and Bavaria.
2.5 Analysis
2.5.1 Income Adaptation
To highlight the mechanics of the separability parameter of the utility function, the top graphic
of Figure 2.5 presents simulated happiness flows for preferences exhibiting income adaptation and
no memory in the habit stock (ρ = 0). Happiness is simulated by feeding US GDP into Equation
(2.5). The effect of γ is clear; the happiness flow becomes more volatile and the positive time trend
diminishes as it increases.11 The bottom graphic of Figure 2.5 compares the happiness simulated
with perfect income adaptation (γ = 1) against measured average happiness. As is evident, sim-
ulated happiness does fairly well at emulating observed well-being well. This illustrates the rea-
soning behind the interpretation of the Easterlin paradox as evidence that people perfectly adapt
to income.
Columns (1) to (4) of Table 2.4 report macro-level estimates of Equation (2.5) as well as the
corresponding γ̂s. The estimates from columns (1) and (3) were obtained with only one period
included in the reference income (ρ = 0). Columns (2) and (4) presents the estimated coefficients
obtained with three lags in the reference income. One way to interpret the γ is to view it as the
level of adaptation, or separability, necessary to convert measured GDP into the observed aggre-
gate well-being flow. For the US, the estimated γ is significant and suggest better than perfect
income adaptation, γ > 1. In Germany, the estimates are more imprecise, partly because the time
series is shorter, and suggest an even higher level of adaptation. Because average life satisfaction
in Germany has been falling, rather than being stagnant over the period studied, converting an in-
creasing GDP into decreasing well-being requires even higher levels of adaptation. Nonetheless,
the γ̂s reflect the level of adaptation that can be inferred from aggregate data; such estimates are
the under-pinnings of the idea that people perfectly adapt to income.
11The time trend becomes insignificant when γ reaches 1. Not shown.
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Columns (5) to (8) of Table 2.4 report micro-level estimates of Equation (2.6) and the corre-
sponding γ̂s, with income measured at the individual level. Since the GSS is a repeated cross-
section, the estimates were obtained by converting the data into a pseudo-panel of income quin-
tiles. The coefficients are obtained by estimating 2.6 with residual happiness from a regression of
individual happiness on the controls. When compared to the estimates obtained with aggregate
data, the level of separability suggested by the micro analysis is much lower. The analysis of US
data reveals no trace of adaptation, but once again the sample size is rather small (5 quintiles for
35 years). Perhaps more convincing are the estimates obtained with the GSOEP data. These re-
gressions, which include individual fixed effects as well as a range of controls, find evidence of
moderate adaptation. Specification (7) suggests that the negative effect of past income (-0.0915) is
about a third of the positive effect of contemporaneous income (0.2943) in the utility function. The
corresponding γ is 0.31.
Using the same data, DiTella, Haisken-De New and MacCulloch use a “back of the envelope”
calculation to interpret the level of adaptation that they estimate [Rafeal Di Tella and MacCul-
loch(2004)]. They look at the permanent effect of economic growth by computing the portion of
the initial rise in well-being remaining after the four period of adaptation allowed (leaving aside
for now the fact that some of these coefficients are not-significant). According to the estimation
presented in column (8), 0.1445 of the initial impact remains after four years (0.2935-0.0651-0.0268-
0.0332-0.0239). In Germany, real GDP per capita rose by 129% (GDP was 2.3 times larger in 2004
then in 1984) over the period covered by the GSOEP. The impact on life satisfaction suggested by
the model, would be to raise well-being by 0.12 on the 0-10 scale (0.14*ln(2.3)) or 7% of a stan-
dard deviation (0.12/1.77). DiTella and al’s interpretation is that such a level of adaptation is
“sufficiently large as to be able to explain why no long-run trend in happiness is observable over
several decades” [Rafeal Di Tella and MacCulloch(2004)]. The problem with the reasoning how-
ever, is that although 7% of a standard-deviation over 20 years might seem like a negligible rise in
happiness, in Germany aggregate subjective well-being did not remain flat during that period but
fell by 40% of a standard deviation. Clearly adaptation is at best a partial solution to the Easterlin
paradox.
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Income Adaptation as a Solution to the Happiness Income Puzzle
Although at the country level the empirical relationship between happiness, contemporaneous
and past income appears consistent with high levels of income adaptation there is no evidence
of perfect income adaptation at the individual level. Furthermore, the level of separability of
the happiness function estimated with micro-economic data is insufficient to explain the lack of
growth in aggregate happiness. Moreover, perfect income adaptation has very specific behavioral
implications that remain controversial in other fields; Section 2.6 discusses that topic.
2.5.2 Social Comparison
This section verifies whether the social comparison models presented as solutions to the hap-
piness income puzzle in the literature find empirical support. Three reference income measures
are studied: average national income, average regional income and average world income.
Table 2.5 presents different estimations of Equation 2.8. All specifications include socio-demographic
controls. The left-hand side, columns (1) to (4), reports estimates obtained with the GSS data while
the right-hand side reports those obtained with the GSOEP data. The coefficients come from lin-
ear regressions. For each specification, γ is reported on a separate line. The GSOEP allows the
inclusion of individual fixed effects. The middle two lines thus also report estimates of the degree
of separability with and without individual fixed effects. When the reference income is the coun-
try’s GDP or the World’s GDP, the errors are clustered at the year level. When average regional
income is used as the reference income measure, the errors are clustered at the regional level. The
coefficients of the control variables have been left out to make the table more concise.
GDP per capita
As expected, own income has a positive effect on individual subjective well-being in all spec-
ifications. Columns (1) and (5) estimate the happiness function of agents that care about how
their income compares to the nation’s average, as in Clarck and al 2008 [Andrew E. Clark and
Shields(2008)]. If this social comparison model is accurate, the coefficient on ln(GDP ) should be
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negative. This is not the case in either column. In the GSS, the coefficient on ln(GDP ) is insignifi-
cant and in the GSOEP, it is positive (significant). The corresponding estimated γ’s are thus either
nonsignificant (-0.49) or negative (-14.45). Excluding the fixed effects in the GSOEP reverses the
sign of the coefficient and generates the expected negative coefficient on ln(GDP ) , as indicated by
the positive estimate of separability reported (5.06). One reason for a positive coefficient on GDP
may be that the negative status effect of average income is overwhelmed by the positive effects of
a rising GDP per capita documented by Helliwell [Helliwell and Huang(2005)]. Unfortunately, the
data does not allow for separation of these effects. Regardless, if the analysis is correctly specified,
the lack of negative association between GDP and individual well-being should be interpreted as
evidence that models of social comparison using the average national income to measure reference
income receive mixed empirical support at best.
Regional Income
Columns (2) and (6), estimate the happiness function of agents whose reference group is ge-
ographically closer to them, i.e. people in their region. The coefficients estimated with the GSS
data support the idea that people care about how they compare to their neighbors. The estimated
degree of separability is 1.45, which suggests that agents care even more about their neighbors’
income than their own. This is the type of coefficient magnitude that has led some to the con-
clusion that economic growth leaves everyone worse off. However, contrary to what the model
predicts, in the GSOEP, the effect of regional income is positive, γ is negative at -4.56. Column (6)
also reports the corresponding γ obtained without the fixed effects; it is positive (2.24). Here too,
time invariant personal characteristics appear to change the effect of reference income.
In his analysis, Luttmer found the negative effect of neighbor’s income to be robust to fixed ef-
fects. The current analysis does not reach the same conclusion. The pattern of estimates obtained
with and without the fixed effects suggests that regional income might have a negative effect on in-
dividual well-being because unobservable individual characteristics that make individuals happy
also affect their decision of where to live. This could be the case if, for example, people favorably
disposed to happiness chose to live in poorer rural areas. Others, like Barrington-Leigh and Helli-
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well, have documented the fact that the geographic scale at which people make comparison is the
metropolitan region in which they live [Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell(2008)]. For that reason,
although it is unclear why the result depends so heavily on the inclusion of fixed effects, it ap-
pears that models of social comparison where the region is the reference point can be considered
a potential explanation to the Easterlin paradox.
World GDP per capita
Column (3) and (7) estimate the happiness function of agents that care about how their income
compares to the world’s average. Here, both the GSS and the GSOEP estimates (with fixed effects)
reject the idea that people make comparisons across borders. In both data set, the coefficient on
ln(World) is not significantly different then zero. This type of model is rejected.
Mixture Model
Finally, columns (4) and (8) estimate models of social comparison that include all three refer-
ence group. One interpretation of such models is that agents care about how their income com-
pares to the average income in their region but also how the average income in their region com-
pares to the national average and so on and so forth with the other reference points. The following
illustrates this idea and shows how such models are equivalent to the one estimated in Table 2.5.
SWBijt = β1 ln(yijt) + β2 ln(
yijt
Yjt
) + β3 ln(
Yjt
GDPt




β0 + X ′λk + φij + εitj
SWBijt = (β1 + β2) ln(yijt) + (β3 − β2) ln(Yjt) + (β4 − β3) ln(GDPt)(2.11)
− β4 ln(Wt) + β0 + X ′λk + φij + εitj
In the GSS, the only reference group to have a significant effect on individual well-being is regional
income, further confirming the idea that people compare their income to others who are geograph-
ically proximate. The alternative interpretation is that this could be due to the fact that β3 and β4
are of similar magnitude, nullifying the apparent effect of GDP. However, since β4 is not signifi-
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cantly different than zero, this is unlikely. The results are reversed in the GSOEP; regional income
is the only reference point that is not significantly linked to individual well-being. Interpreting this
constellation of coefficient under Equation (2.11) suggests that β3 > β2 > β4 > β1 but also that β1,
the coefficient on own income, is negative. Here too, leaving the fixed effects out of the estimation
reverses the results, the γ computed for regional income for that model is reported (1.0630). The
mixture model is too inconsistent with the previous finding that people make geographically close
comparison to be taken as a serious candidate for an explanation.
Social Comparison as a Solution to the Happiness Income puzzle.
Two main pieces of information emerge from the estimation. Firstly, out of the three reference
income measures studied, the only model of social comparison truly grounded in the data is the
regional income model. Secondly, the choice of specification has a a large impact on the results; the
inclusion of individual fixed effects changes the coefficients on reference income for all three spec-
ifications. This is consistent with Ferre-i-Carbonell and Fritjers finding that, unlike the inclusion
of fixed effects, assuming cardinality or ordinality matters little for empirical analysis [i Carbonell
and Fritjers(2004)]
Figure 2.6 presents the happiness flows predicted by the social comparison model with regional
comparisons. Compared to observed happiness (Figure 2.4) the predicted flows do relatively well.
The model can accurately replicate the ordering of the income quintiles (Fact 1), the lack of growth
in average happiness in the US and the fall in average life satisfaction in Germany (Fact 3). The
predicted flows also mimic the widening of the rich poor happiness gap.
The main limitation of a model with geographically close social comparison is that it fails to
explain why richer nation are happier than poorer ones (Fact 3). Indeed, if agents only care about
how their circumstances compare to that of their neighbors, there is no reason why citizens of India
should be less happy than citizens of France. Of course, one can think of many reason as to why
this would be the case. The important point though is that status effects, however important, are
incompatible with that fact when taken alone. The social comparison explanation to the Easterlin
paradox is not one of missing variables.
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Inferring from the Easterlin paradox that the US government should stop pursuing economic
growth is one thing. Reaching the same conclusion about India is another. The Clark et al (2008)
models of national or international comparison do not meet the test of empirical validation. The
only spectrum of comparison that passes the test is the regional reference point, but the litera-
ture suggests that better data would probably diminish the relationship between happiness and
regional comparison. Although it can replicate many of the characteristics of the puzzling relation-
ship between income and subjective well-being, regional social comparison alone fails to explain
why richer countries are happier. The following section presents a breif discussion of the potential
role of income equality in understanding the Easterlin paradox.
2.6 Discussion
2.6.1 The role of Inequality
Rousseau (2009) discussed the importance of accounting for inequality when attempting to
interpret the happiness-income puzzle. He showed that although they are consistent with adap-
tation and comparison models, the patterns observed in the US can also be explained by standard
utility models if the increase in income inequality and the concavity of the happiness function
are properly accounted for [Rousseau(2009)]. When trying to understand the mechanics of the
happiness function, it is crucial to account for the concavity of the function because it can create
a discrepancy between income and happiness. Two countries with the same average GDP per
capita can have different levels of average well-being if their income distribution differs. More
equal countries will tend to have higher average happiness simply because of the concavity of
the happiness function. A different interpretation of this insight is that a more accurate way to
interpret the Eaterlin paradox is that (in part because of status effects), economic expansion raises
average happiness when the growth benefits the whole income distribution.
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2.6.2 Perfect Income Adaptation
Models of adaptation have been widely discussed in macroeconomics. Although the approach
used to identify these types of preferences are very different than the one used in this paper, the
following presents a brief discussion of the similarities.
Internal habit forming agents exhibit very specific behavior that helps reconcile some of the
puzzles of macroeconomics and finance. Habit formation models have come to the rescue of ratio-
nal expectations models in explaining the equity premium and the excess smoothness puzzles [Mehra
and Prescott(1985)], [Constantinides(1990)], [Campbell and Cochrane(1999)] [Luttmer(2000)], [Lawrence
J. Christiano and Evans(2005)]. The risk premium puzzle refers to the fact that classical economic
models of behavior require preferences that exhibit unreasonably high levels of risk-aversion to ex-
plain the spread between the rates of return of stocks and risk-free assets [Mehra and Prescott(1985)].
The excess smoothness puzzle refers to the fact agents react less to unexpected income windfalls
than the permanent income hypothesis would predict.
Agents whose preferences exhibit an extreme level of internal habit, i.e agents who perfectly
adapt to income, allocate their resources over time to spread consumption growth rather than con-
sumption. As a result, the response of consumption to an unexpected windfall follows a “hump-
shape” pattern [Luttmer(2000)]. Agents with habits smooth the discrepancy between consumption
and the habit stock rather than consumption itself. Put differently, they allocate income windfalls
in order to spread income growth. Their reaction to income shocks is sluggish because contem-
poraneous consumption raises the burden of the habit stock in future periods. When agents form
internal habits, they also demand less risky assets because relative to habitless agents they lose
more utility when their income drops below their reference level.
Empirical estimates of γ, the habit coefficient using revealed preference methods are typically
fairly high. Fuhrer found 0.90 [Luttmer(2000)], Christiano et al found 0.65 [Lawrence J. Chris-
tiano and Evans(2005)], Bouakez et al found 0.98, Dennis found 0.88 and Giannoni and Woodford
found 1.00. This is the another reason why interpreting the Easterlin as evidence of adaptation is
tempting; it would also help to explain macroeconomic puzzles.
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Additively Separable Internal Habits
An alternative formulation of the utility function, which departs from the standard macroeco-
nomic literature, is to allow utility to be additively separable with regards to the habit stock. This
does not preclude agents from caring about past circumstances but leads to the same behavioral
patterns as the standard framework of the problem without habit formation. The following model
illustrates this:
u(yt, zt) = u(yt)− γ u(zt)(2.12)








which has the same behavioral implication as the standard version of the problem, i.e. income
(consumption) is smoothed over the life-time.
2.7 Conclusion
The use of subjective well-being items to measure utility is controversial. One way researchers
have found to establish the method, i.e. the equivalence between happiness and utility, is to formu-
late mathematical functions to that end that behave like well-being. The idea is that if happiness
and its puzzling relationship to income can be rationalized by functions, it can be considered a
valid proxy for utility. This paper proposes a true test of these functions which are put forward as
solutions to the Easterlin paradox.
The analysis reveals that when these functions are estimated at the individual level, models of
income adaptation suggest levels of habituation that are too low to explain why economic growth
does not raise average happiness. Out of three candidate reference point for social comparison,
only regional income is supported by empirical analysis. The model has the capacity to replicate
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all but one of the feature of the relationship between income and happiness. While it explains Fact
1,3 and 4, it cannot explain why richer countries have happier citizens.
The paper proposes paths of reflection for future research and argues that a proper interpre-
tation of the Easterlin paradox should take into account the concavity of the happiness function
as well as the evolution of the income distribution over time. The claim that survey measures of
happiness can serve as a proxy for utility is attractive. For that reason, it appears crucial that more














































































































































Figure 2.2: Average Well-Being and Real GDP per Capita Across the World for the Four Waves of
the World Values Survey.
(a) Happiness
(b) Life Satisfaction
Note: Figure displays happiness index, the coefficient of an ordered probit regression of well-being
on country-year dummies.
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Figure 2.3: Average Subjective Well-Being Over Time in the US and Germany.
(a) US (GSS)
(b) Germany (GSOEP)
Note: Figure displays happiness index, the coefficient of an ordered probit regression of well-being
on country-year dummies.
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Figure 2.4: Average Well-Being of the Income Quitiles and the Rich-Poor Happiness Gap in the US
and Germany.
(a) Income % Changes (GSS) (b) Incomes % Changes(GSOEP)
(c) Happiness (GSS) (d) Life Satisfaction (GSOEP)
(e) US (GSS) (f) Germany (GSOEP)
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Figure 2.5: Simulated Happiness for different levels of Income Adaptation (γ)
(a) Different γ
(b) γ = 1
Note: Figure displays simulated happiness obtained by feeding the GDP into Equation 2.4
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Figure 2.6: Happiness predicted by Regional Social Comparison
(a) GSS
(b) GSOEP, with f.e.
Note: Figure displays well-being as predicted the a social comparison model of with regional
income as the income of reference.
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Table 2.1: Well-Being Functions from the Happiness Literature.
Source Happiness Function
DiTella and SWBit = α0ln(yt) + α1ln(yt−1) + ...αT ln(yT ) + β0ln(St)+
MacCulloch (2004) β1ln(St−1) + ...βT ln(ST ) + δXit+ fi + ηt + εit
yit is income and Sit is status. Xit are controls, fi are fixed effects and ηt are wave effects.
Stutzer (2004) SWBi = α+ βln(yi) + γln(y∗i )δXi + εi
= α+ (β + γ)ln(yi) + γln(y∗i /yi) + δXi + εi
yi is individual income and y∗i is aspirations, (y
∗
i /yi) is relative income and Xit are controls.
Luttmer (2004) SWBi = Y ∗ptβ1 +Xitβ2 +Xpδ + wavetβ4 + δs + εispt
Y ∗pt is reference income. Xit is a vector of personal characteristics including personal income. Xp is a
vector of regional characteristics and δp is a vector of state dummies.
Vendrick and SWBit = α+ β̃ln(yit) + γln(y∗it) + δXit + fiε
Woltjer (2007) = α+ (β̃ − γ)ln(yit) + γln(yit/y∗it) + δXit + fi + ε
yi is individual income and y∗i is reference group’s income, (y
∗
i /yi) is relative income. Xit are controls
and fi are individual fixed effects.
Dynan and SWBit = ρ0 + ρ1ln(yit) + ρ2ln(yrit) + ρ3Φit + ε
Ravina (2007)
yi is individual income and yri is the difference between average earning within a person’s education-
occupation-state-year and the average earnings within a person’s state-year. Φit are controls.
Barrington-Leigh SWBit = c+ αXi + βyi +
∑
r∈Ri
(δrȳr + γZr + vr) + εi
and Helliwell (2008)
yi is individual income and yri is the income of reference groups varying in geographic size centered
around the respondent. Zr are regional characteristics Xit are controls
Clark, Fritjers SWBit = α+ β1ln(yit) + β2ln(yit/y∗it) + δXit + ε




t ) + δXit + ε
yi is individual income and Xit are individual level controls and include weekly hours of work. In
the social comparison model, y∗it is the average national income and y
∗
i is World’s average income.
In the adaptation model, y∗it is a convex combination of past incomes.
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Table 2.2: Well Being Questions from Different Data Sources.
Source Question
General Taken all together, how would you say things are these days
Social Survey would you say that you are:
1. Very Happy 2. Pretty Happy 3. Not too Happy
H̄ = 2.20 σ = 0.63
German Socio In conclusion, we would like to ask you about
Economic Panel your satisfaction with your life in general.
0. Completely dissatisfied (...) 10. Completely satisfied
L̄S = 7.12 σ = 1.77
Eurobarometer “Taking all things together, how would you say things are
these days, would you say you’re:”
1. Very Happy 2. Pretty Happy 3. Not too Happy
“Please tell me whether you are with your life in general?”
1. Very satisfied 2. Fairly satisfied
3. Not very satisfied 4. Not at all satisfied
Table 2.3: Income Questions From Different Data Sources.
General Social Survey
“In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year
before taxes, that is? Just tell me the letter.”
A. Under $1,000 ... Y. $150,000 or over
German Socio Economic Panel
“If you take a look at the total income from all members of the household: how high is the
monthly household income today?” Please state the net monthly income, which means
after deductions for taxes and social security. Please include regular income such as pensions,
housing allowance, child allowance, grants for higher education support payments, etc.”
The information from each item is obtain from unfolding bracket questions.
Eurobarometer
“Please count the total wages and salaries per month of all members of this households,
all pensions and social benefits; child allowance and any other income like rents, etc...
Please indicate the letter of the income group your household falls into before tax and .
other deductions.”



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Happiness and Income Inequality
3.1 Introduction
Well-being measures are receiving increasingly more attention from policy makers, especially
in Europe. The British government has ordered a report on “the evidence relating to the causative
factors associated with various concepts and components of (personal) well-being”. The topic is
so popular in England that the University of Sheffield now has a Centre for Well-being in Public
Policy, dedicated to studying “how people’s health and well-being can be defined, measured and
improved in ways that help policy-makers determine the best use of scarce resources”.1
Views concerning the usefulness of subjective well-being for research vary greatly within the
academic community. At one end of the spectrum, some are calling for a paradigm shift, while
others express profound scepticism. To better understand what can be learned from happiness
research, economists need to understand how subjective well-being relates to income. Economic
theory suggests that people derive utility from opportunities and more income typically means
more opportunities. If “money doesn’t buy happiness”, subjective well-being is a very different
measure of welfare than income or wealth.
Studying US data, Richard Easterlin was one of the first to note that although at some point
in time richer individuals are happier, over time economic growth is not accompanied with an
1http://www.shef.ac.uk/cwipp/index.html
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increase in aggregate happiness [Easterlin(1974)]. The apparent inconsistency between these two
phenomena took his name and is referred to as the Easterlin Paradox. Numerous papers have
since explored different explanations to this puzzle with many interpreting it as evidence that
classical conceptions of utility need revision. The most popular explanation is that when assessing
how happy or satisfied they are with their life, people make comparisons. They compare their
own current circumstances with past ones [Rafeal Di Tella and MacCulloch(2004)] and with that
of others [Andrew E. Clark and Shields(2008)].
Under the assumption of equivalence between well-being and utility, when individuals derive
well-being from having more income than they did in the past, their preferences exhibit income
adaptation and when they derive utility from having more income than others, their preferences
exhibit social comparisons. Both phenomena find empirical support but they are somewhat chal-
lenging to identify [Luttmer(2004)], [Rafeal Di Tella and MacCulloch(2004)]. Measuring income
adaptation requires micro-level panels therefore only a few data sources can be used. Measur-
ing social comparison is challenging because the researcher has to construct the reference point
of comparison (neighbors, average GDP/capita, hypothetical person, etc.). Furthermore, some of
the expected empirical manifestations of these preferences, such as differences in cross and within
country well-being-income gradients, are not observed in the data [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)].
Interpreting the Easterlin paradox as evidence that peoples’ preferences exhibit income adap-
tation and social comparisons has led many to the conclusion that governments should stop pur-
suing economic growth and make income taxes more progressive [Layard(2005)]. The idea is that
people adapt to growing incomes and that lowering income differences would raise average hap-
piness. When individuals compare themselves to one another, the extra utility someone receives
from having a high income comes at the expense of those who compare themselves with him. The
pursuit of individual wealth should thus be discouraged by increasing tax rates at the top.
Within the happiness literature, much effort has been targeted at explaining the happiness-
income puzzle with the Easterlin paradox almost systematically the starting point of analysis [An-
drew E. Clark and Shields(2008)], [Frey and Stutzer(2002)]. Recently Stevenson and Wolfers pre-
sented evidence suggesting a positive relationship between GDP growth and average well-being
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[Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]. More precisely, they found that the income well-being gradient
is the same within country, across country and over time. Their findings, they say, “put to rest the
claim that economic growth doesn’t lead to happiness and (...) undermine the role played by rela-
tive income comparisons”.2 Although it varies in strength, evidence that economic growth raises
aggregate happiness can be found roughly everywhere outside the US. The authors conclude that
“the failure of happiness to rise in the US remains a puzzling outlier”. Thus the question: “Why
has economic growth not raised average happiness in the US?”.
Relying solely on classical economic theory, this paper proposes an explanation of the lack of
serial correlation between economic growth and average happiness in the US. The interpretation
builds on the concavity of the happiness function and takes into account the evolution of income
inequality over the last few decades.3 When the data is disaggregated by income group, happiness
trends observed in the US and elsewhere are consistent with agents whose happiness depends
solely on their own income, and not on past income or the income of others.
3.1.1 A simple explanation of the Easterlin Paradox
The lack of growth in aggregate happiness despite the economic growth experienced in the US
is not necessarily a paradox. If, as the economy grows, inequality increases in such a way that
incomes fall for the poor, the pull on average happiness being exerted by the rich will be offset by
the drag exerted by the poor. Although the income gains of the rich are larger in magnitude than
the losses of the poor, average income is growing, the concavity of the function is such that the
effects on well-being are similar. Figure 3.1 illustrates this intuition.
This interpretation of the Easterlin paradox builds on the following three propositions.
Proposition 1. The happiness function is concave.
Proposition 2. Real income has risen for the rich and fallen for the poor.
Proposition 3. Happiness has risen for the rich and fallen for the poor.
2Most theories of comparisons suggest that the within country income-well-being gradient should be smaller than the
across country GDP-average-well-being gradient.
3The expression “happiness function” is used to describe the relationship between subjective well-being and income.
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The paper shows that each proposition finds empirical support and extends the discussion
about the importance of income equality in the conversion of economic growth into aggregate
happiness to other countries. The analysis starts with a formal estimation of the curvature of
the happiness function. The existence of a satiation point, or plateau, is assessed by examining
the relationship between well-being and income among the richest. This is done to test the idea
that the happiness-income puzzle reflects the fact that, after a certain point, “money doesn’t buy
happiness”. The paper explores the evolution of the distribution of income and well-being in
the US, revealing that real income has indeed fallen for the bottom and second income quintiles.
Subjective well-being has followed a pattern similar to income in that the gap between the rich and
poor has widened over the last four decades. The rising income gap between individuals at the
top of the income distribution and their poorer counterparts over the last 35 years has parallelled
an increasing happiness gap. Finally, analyses are conducted with data from Europe to confirm
the important role of income inequality in the conversion of economic growth into aggregate well-
being.
The second part of the paper explores the possibility that the Easterlin paradox is a result of
measurement error. The idea is that even though measured income has been rising, true income
may have remained flat, explaining the lack of growth in happiness. The slope of the happiness
function is estimated for corrections for taxes and the transitory nature of income.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.3 describes the data used for the analysis. Spe-
cific descriptions of the subjective well-being and income measures are presented, along with an
explanation of the method used for converting the qualitative subjective well-being answers to
quantitative information . Section 3.3.1 presents an estimation of the degree of curvature of the
happiness function and tests for the existence of a satiation point the well-being. A discussion of
the evolution of the income distribution (3.3.2) and the rich-poor happiness gap (3.3.3) in the US
follows. Section 3.3.5 uses European data to assess whether patterns observed in other countries
confirm the importance of the concavity of the well-being function and income inequality in the
conversion of economic growth into general subjective well-being. Section 3.4.1 investigates the
44
effect of different corrections for the income variable. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data
Four sources of data are used in this paper. The General Social Survey (GSS) is a repeated
micro-level cross section of about 1600 Americans covering the years from 1972 to 2006 (with
some gaps). The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a bi-annual panel of roughly 22,000 retired
Americans covering the years from 1992 to 2004. The Eurobarometer (EB) is a repeated cross-
section of anywhere between 450 and 4250 respondents (averaging at about 1600) from different
European nations from 1974 to 2004. The same countries are sampled annually with countries
added over time. The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) is an annual panel of about 2750
German adults; it gathers detailed socioeconomic information as well as a life satisfaction measure
over a period ranging from 1984 to 2005.
3.2.1 Well-Being
Table 3.1 reports the questionnaire items used to measure subjective well-being in each of the
surveys. With the exception of the HRS, the items are somewhat similar. The HRS measures come
from answers to a subset of questions from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies of Depression
(CES-D), aimed at measuring depressive symptoms. The questions ask “Now think about the
past week and the feelings you have experienced. Please tell me if each of the following was true
(Yes/No) for you much of the time this past week? Much of the time during the past week you
have felt - sad, happy, depressed and enjoyed life”.
When estimating the degree of curvature of the happiness function, simply converting the
qualitative answers into numbers would not be appropriate because the choice of scale could affect
the estimation.4 For that reason this paper turns to the method used by Stevenson and Wolfers for
aggregating well-being scores across groups [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]. The idea is to use
the coefficients from ordered probit regressions of subjective well-being on group dummies (with
4For example, the GSS is usually coded according to: “Not too Happy”=1, “Pretty Happy”=2 and “Very Happy”=3.
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no other controls) as the average well-being for that group. The following makes the procedure
explicit.
SWBit = β0 + Iit∆k + εit
The subscripts i and t denote individuals and time periods. SWBit is the subjective well-being of
the respondent. The variable Iit is a n×k matrix of binary group membership indicators and ∆k is
a k × 1 vector of coefficients. The coefficients, δ, are interpreted as well-being indices that capture
shifts in an underlying normally distributed latent well-being variable. Unless otherwise specified,
the ordered probits are estimated on the entire sample (all years, countries, etc.). Depending on
the grouping variables used, the procedure allows for different levels of aggregation, i.e. ∆k can
take different lengths.
δnt Country×year averages(k = t× j)
δjnt Income groups × countries × year averages (k = j × n× t)
For the curvature analysis, the groups are either the income categories in the survey or twenty
equally weighted bins (each with 5% of the income distribution) used as group dummies if the
income variable is continuous, as it is the case in the HRS and GSOEP,. These subjective well-
being indices are also employed to present the data graphically.
3.2.2 Income
Table 3.2 reports the wording of the questionnaire items used to collect the information about
the respondents’ income. The GSOEP and the HRS are the only two sources of data to have non-
categorical income measures. The GSS, the WVS and the EB rely on roughly 5 to 15 income cat-
egories per country-wave. For these surveys the income variable is converted into a numerical
figure by assigning the value that corresponds to the mid-point of the income categories chosen
by the respondent. The highest income bracket is converted by adding half of the distance between
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the top and bottom bounds of the previous category to the lowest bound of the top category.5 For
most surveys, the income categories do not change annually year but do so relatively frequently,
at least once every five years.
For the GSS, a net of tax income measure is obtained using the National Bureau of Economic
Research TAXSIM 8 software.6 The available criteria used for the tax simulation are the year, the
number of dependents, the marital status and the respondent’s nominal household income.
GDP per capita and CPI, used to convert nominal into real figures, come from the World Penn
Tables [of Pennsilvanya(2007)] and the OECD web site [OECD(2007)].
3.3 Analysis
This section provides empirical evidence in support of Propositions 1, 2 and 3. The analysis
starts by exploring the properties of the well-being function. The evolution of the income and
happiness distribution in the US over the last forty years follows. European data is then analyzed
to investigate the role of income inequality in the conversion of economic growth into well-being.
Finally, formal estimations of the well-being income gradient are reported for different corrections
in the measurement of the income variable.
3.3.1 Proposition 1: The Happiness Function
Figures 3.2 through 3.6 present cross-sections of real income and subjective well-being indices
for the US, Germany and other European countries. As explained earlier, the SWB indexes come
from country-specific ordered probit regressions of happiness on income-group-year membership
variables. The index is the coefficient on a respondent’s group.
The left hand side figures plot SWB and income on a normal scale and the right hand side fig-
ures present SWB and income on a logarithmic scale. Every year for which the data was collected
is super-imposed, the x axis is in real figures. The dashed lines plot well-being predicted by a
5For example, if the previous to last category is $45,000 to $55,000 and the top category is $55,001 and up, the numerical
figure attributed to respondents that chose the top income category is $60,000.
6http://www.nber.org/ taxsim/taxsim-calc8/index.html
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linear regression of the well-being indices on the logarithm of income (no controls). The shape of
the well-being function is remarkably similar across countries. These figures should rule out any
doubt about the concavity of the well-being function. In every country and for every well-being
measure, the relationship between individual income and well-being is clearly concave. Also, in
the US, correcting for taxes (Figure 3c and 3d) eliminates what appears to be a group of very happy
poor outliers visible on the raw income figure (3a and 3b).
To formalize the insight that emerges from visual inspection of the figures, the degree of cur-
vature of the well-being function is estimated through a Box-Cox transformation analysis. The
procedure estimates
SWBi = α+ βg(yi) + εi where g(yi) = (yλi − 1)/λ
yi represent individual i income. The λ captures the degree of curvature of the function. A λ
greater than 1 implies a convex function. At exactly 1, the function is linear and for values below 1
the function is increasingly concave. Finally, the function is of the logarithm form when λ equals 0.
Figure 3.8 plots g(y) for different λ on a linear and logarithmic scale. Notice that when the under-
lying function is less concave than the logarithm, it appears convex when plotted on a logarithm
scale; the converse is also true.
The second column of Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 report country specific estimates of λ. The es-
timates confirm the concavity of the well-being function regardless of the country and subjective
well-being measure. For the US the well-being function estimated with the GSS data is less con-
cave (λ̂ = 0.5) than that estimated with the HRS data (around 0). This is not due to the fact that
income in the GSS does not account for taxes and transfers since the degree of curvature estimated
with net income actually suggests a less concave function (λ̂ = 0.6). When income is measured
directly (HRS), as opposed to categorically, the degree of curvature of the happiness function esti-
mated in the US is close to zero, the log-linear form.
In Europe, the degree of concavity of the well-being function appears to vary a great deal
across countries (second and third column). However, as discussed earlier, this could be due to
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differences in tax systems. Estimates of the degree of curvature of the life satisfaction function
range from 0.1 (Greece) to 1.3 (Ireland). In all but one country (Belgium), estimates of the degree
of curvature of the happiness function are lower (weakly), implying a more concave function, and
range from -0.2 (England) to 0.4 (Germany).
The relationship between income and life satisfaction is less concave than the relationship be-
tween income and happiness. Differently put, the marginal happiness of a dollar diminishes at a
faster rate than the marginal life satisfaction of a dollar. One possible explanation is that the life
satisfaction question more explicitly asks respondents to make comparisons when assessing their
well-being. Indeed, when respondents focus on other peoples’ circumstances; extra income has
an important effect on well-being even at high levels. For most functional forms, an increase in
income improves an individual’s relative position regardless of where he/she is along the income
distribution (unless at the top). More generally, the channels linking income and life satisfaction
might be different than the channels linking income and happiness. These different properties
point to the fact that failing to make a distinction between the two measures may be a mistake. For
example, one should be wary of comparisons between a within-country happiness gradient and a
across-country life satisfaction gradient.
Satiation
Newspaper articles often suggest that the lack of growth in average happiness is due to the ex-
istence of a satiation point in the happiness function, i.e. a level of income above which additional
income does not affect happiness [Begley()]. To explore this possibility the effect of income among
the very rich is investigated. If the happiness function exhibits satiation, money should not buy
happiness for this subpopulation.
The third, fourth and fifth columns of Table 3.3 and Table 3.5 report the smallest top income
decile within which income has a statistically significant positive effect on well-being. The tables
report the estimated coefficient from ordered probits and the corresponding full-sample estimate.
For instance, in the GSS, when raw income is used, the smallest top income group for which
income increases happiness is 10%. At 0.393, the income coefficient is actually higher within that
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group than among the whole population, 0.239. Using net income does not affect these results. The
smallest top groups in the HRS are somewhat larger and the effect of income is smaller in those
groups. Looking at the figures (3.2 and 3.3) reveals that a large number of middle income earners
report being “highly happy” for three of the four HRS well-being measures . Additionally, out of
all four, “Feeling depressed” is the well-being indicator that behaves most like the GSS happiness
question. The results are very similar in Europe, where income raises well-being even among the
top 10% richest These results are shown in Table 3.5.
The well-being function is clearly concave and there is no evidence of satiation as the well-
being function is positively sloped even among top earners. Proposition 1 is confirmed. Fur-
thermore, using a log-linear function to capture the concavity of the relationship between indi-
vidual well-being and income, as is the norm in the field, is a valid choice since it corresponds to
the degree of parametrically estimated concavity. This specific form implies that proportional in-
come gains bring the same well-being gain regardless of one’s position on the income distribution.
Money buys happiness but, it gets more expensive as people get richer.
3.3.2 Proposition 2: Income Inequality
Panel (a) of Figure 3.9 shows the evolution of real income for each quintile of the US Gen-
eral Social Survey. Income inequality has grown among the GSS respondents over the last four
decades. Real income for the bottom and second quintiles has decreased by an average of 0.58%
and 0.55% a year respectively. Real income for the third, fourth and top quintiles has increased
by an average of 0.15%, 0.79% and 0.90% a year respectively. The gap between the 1st and 5th
quintile has thus grown by about 1.5% per year. While the average income of the top quintile was
about 9 times larger than that of the bottom’s in 1973 it was close to 10.5 times larger by the end
of 2006 . The income patterns in the GSS support Proposition 2. Furthermore, because it is con-
ducted with income measured with categorical questions, the analysis most likely underestimates
the magnitude of the rise in income inequality.
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3.3.3 Proposition 3: The Happiness Gap
Panel (b) of Figure 3.9 reports the happiness for each quintile of the GSS since 1973. Happi-
ness has polarized over the years, decreasing for the bottom quintiles and stagnating for the top
quintiles. Figure 3.10 presents the evolution of the percentage of respondents answering “Very
Happy”, “Pretty Happy” and “Not too Happy” for each income group. The figure shows that
the proportion of the poorest respondents reporting to be “Very Happy” dropped for every in-
come quintile over the last four decades. The proportion of richest respondent reporting to be
“Unhappy” has also dropped over the same period. Interestingly, the frequency of “Very Happy”
answers has dropped while the frequency of “Happy” has risen for every income group since the
mid-seventies. The happiness gap between the rich and poor has widened because the switch from
“Very Happy” to “Happy” has been more drastic for the poorer income groups.
To get a sense of the magnitude of the widening of the happiness gap, Table 3.6 reports esti-
mates from four different specification of the following ordered probit:
SWBit = β0 + βPPoorit + βMMidit + βXControlsit
+βPT (Poor × Time) + βMT (Mid× Time) + βRT (Rich× Time) + εit
where Poorit, Midit and Richit are mutually exclusive group dummies representing the member-
ship of respondent i to the bottom, middle three or top income quintiles in period t. βP and βM
capture the difference in happiness between the corresponding group and the rich in 1973. The
coefficients on the (Group×Time) variables, βPT , βMT and βRT reflect the average annual change
in happiness for each group. Controlsit include the respondent’s age, gender, ethnicity, marital
status and education.
To help with the interpretation, column (4) is discussed in detail; this specification includes
the sociodemographic controls. As captured by β̂P , the happiness gap between the rich and poor
in 1973 was 60% of one standard deviation. This difference grew by 0.44% every year (β̂PT ) to
reach 74.5% by the end of 2006 (β̂PT × 33 years). The happiness gap between the top and bottom
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income quintile has grown by 14.5% of one standard deviation over that period.7 Said differently,
the happiness difference between the bottom 20% poorest and the top 20% richest is 25% larger in
2003 than it was in 1975. During the same period, the income gap between these groups rose by
0.4 standard deviations.
The estimated happiness gap between the middle and rich income group(β̂M ) was 21.73% of
one standard deviation in 1973. It grew by 0.39% (β̂MT ) every year to reach 34.6% of a standard
deviation in 2006 (β̂MT × 33 years), a 12.9% increase. Notice that the gap between the middle and
bottom quintiles remained roughly constant over that period since the well-being of both groups
decreased at a similar rate.
The widening of the happiness gap is confirmed. It is not attributable to changes in the com-
position of the quintiles since the exclusion of controls does not affect the results. In the US, hap-
piness has fallen for the poor and middle income groups and stagnated for the rich (Proposition
3 is confirmed). Stevenson and Wolfers discuss the fall in overall variance in happiness since
the mid-seventies and interpret this decline as a decline in happiness inequality [Stevenson and
Wolfers(2008b)]. In light of the facts that the happiness of the poor has fallen and the gap between
the rich and poor has widened this interpretation appears misleading. Indeed, both in relative and
absolute terms, poor people are less happy today than they were in the seventies.
3.3.4 The Easterlin Paradox Revisited
The idea that the happiness income puzzle can be explained solely by the concavity of the
happiness function and the evolution of incomes finds support in the data. 1) The happiness
function is concave. 2) Income inequality has increased since the mid seventies and real income
has fallen for the poorest two quintiles. 3) Happiness tracks income changes along a concave
function, well-being has stagnated for the rich and dropped for the poor. The following subsection
investigates the role of income inequality in the conversion of economic growth into aggregate
well-being in other countries to further validate this reading of the happiness income puzzle.
7The ordered probit normalizes the standard deviation to one.
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3.3.5 The Happiness-Income Puzzle in Europe
Table 3.8 and 3.9 report estimates of the rich poor well-being gap and its evolution for each
country. The bottom rows of the table report the evolution of the well-being gap over time. GDP
per capita increased in all countries during the time of the survey. These regressions are country
specific and include year dummies as well as a set of controls for age, ethnicity, gender, marital
status and education. The interpretation of the coefficients is the same as that of Table 3.6.
In countries where income inequality has either fallen or remained constant, average life sat-
isfaction has risen on par with GDP per capita. This is the case in France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, Denmark, and Spain. In Holland and Great Britain, average life satisfaction has risen
despite rising income inequality. This is not inconsistent with the interpretation of the Easterlin
paradox put forward in this paper.8 Portugal displays patterns similar to the US. In both countries,
aggregate well-being stagnated (failed) despite a growing economy. In that sense, the Easterlin
paradox is not exclusively an American phenomenon.
In all but one country (Belgium), economic growth was accompanied by an (weak) increase in
the rich-poor well-being gap. This should be regarded as a stylized characteristic of the relation-
ship between subjective well-being and income over time.
Table 3.10 reports estimates of country-level life satisfaction regressions. Column (1) estimates
the effect of the logarithm of GDP per capita on aggregate life satisfaction. The gradient is positive
and significant at 0.183. The second specification (2) looks at the effect of the average logarithm of
income which captures changes in the income distribution not captured by average income. The
gradient for this estimation is roughly half of the ln(GDP) coefficient at 0.096. However, when the
estimation includes both variables (Column 3), only the average log-income remains significantly
linked to aggregate well-being, confirming the role of income inequality in the conversion of eco-
nomic growth into aggregate well-being. Overall, the patterns in Europe are consistent with the
notion that aggregate well-being is driven by individual income.
8As long as the whole income distribution benefits from the economic growth (i.e. real incomes do not fall for the
poor) average well-being will rise despite increasing income inequality. Furthermore, even if real incomes fall for the poor,
average well-being will rise if the well-being gains of the rich is larger than the well-being loses of the poor.
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3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Taxes and Permanent Income
Another explanation of the happiness-income puzzle is that the lack of growth in average hap-
piness as a function of income reflects the fact that income is improperly measured. The idea is
that although measured income has risen substantially since the seventies, true income has not.
This section looks at whether correcting for taxes and the transitory nature of income affects the
relationship between income and subjective well-being.
Table 3.7 reports estimates from ordered probit regressions of subjective well-being on different
income measures. The estimation uses data from the GSS and from the GSOEP. Note that while the
GSS well-being measure asks about the respondent’s happiness the GSOEP measure asks about
life satisfaction. The log-linear form is assumed for these estimations.
Column (1) reports the estimated happiness-income gradient from an ordered probit of well-
being on raw income in the US. Column (2) presents the same specification using net income
computed with TAXSIM8. Both specifications include year dummies and controls for age, marital
status, gender and race. Under the assumption that happiness, like utility, depends on disposable
income, one would expect net income to have a larger effect on well-being. This is indeed the
case; the coefficient is 0.15 for raw income and 0.16 for net income. Although the coefficients are
statistically different the difference is minimal. Column (3) reports the same coefficient using data
from Germany, with life satisfaction as the well-being variable. The income well-being gradient
is higher in this case but since both the sample and well-being measure are different across the
countries, discussion will be limited to within country comparisons. Column (4) presents the
estimate obtained with a fixed-effect model. This model does not affect the gradient substantially.
Column (5) uses lagged income to proxy for permanent income to test the hypothesis that well-
being, like utility, depends not on transitory income but permanent income. The argument as to
why lagged income is a proper instrument for permanent income is detailed in the Appendix.
Succinctly put, the only part of lagged income that is related to contemporaneous well-being is
the permanent part, this is not the case for contemporaneous income. This correction actually
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lowers the well-being-income gradient (0.221). The fact that unlike utility, well-being depends
on transitory income, could be interpreted as evidence that well-being does not measure utility.
Overall, the Easterlin paradox does not appear to be a result of mismeasurement of income.
3.4.2 Income Adaptation and Social Comparison
The interpretation of the Easterlin paradox presented in this paper does not rule out the possi-
bility that individual preferences exhibit income adaptation or social comparison. It does however
call into question the stylized facts that have motivated most discussions of these phenomena in
happiness research as well as the notion that aggregate happiness data is informative of individ-
ual preferences. There is evidence that individuals compare their circumstances with that of others
and get accustomed to changes in their lives [Frey and Stutzer(2002)]. Whether these phenomena
have an economically important effect at the macroeconomic level is unclear.
Research on hedonic adaptation suggests that people adapt to new circumstances very rapidly.
Kimball, Ohtake, and Tsutsui find that the type of adaptation described by psychologists takes
place over very short periods of time [Miles Kimball and Tsutsui(2006)]. Kimball and Silverman
find, for example, that widows adapt to the loss of their partner in about nine months [Kimball and
Silverman(2008)]. The type of adaptation described by psychologists and studied by the authors
does not seem to be the mechanism at work in the behavior of long run happiness.
Research on social comparison suggests that people compare themselves to people who are
geographically close to them [Barrington-Leigh and Helliwell(2008)]. One implication is that the
well-being income gradient should be smaller for cross-country than for within-country regres-
sions. When individuals derive utility from comparisons with people living in their own country,
regressions are driven not by between-country variations but by within-country variations. In
fact, if agents only care about where they rank in their country, there should be no positive associ-
ation between a nation’s GDP per capita and the average level of subjective well-being. Stevenson
and Wolfers could not reject the hypothesis that the within and between-country gradients are
equal [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008a)]. This paper investigated the possibility that this is due to
errors in the measurement of income and found that it is not the case.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper presents the Easterlin paradox under a new light. It argues that the assumption of
equivalence between happiness and utility does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that peo-
ples’ preferences are different than what standard notions of utility suggest. Like the utility func-
tion described in introductory economics courses, the relationship between income and subjective
well-being is concave. Whether this should be interpreted as evidence that subjective well-being
captures utility is an open question.
The lack of growth in aggregate happiness despite massive economic growth reflects the fact
that, over the last few decades, income gains have accrued to the top income earners to such a
disproportionate extent that income has fallen for the poor. Over the last thirty-five years the
happiness gap between the rich and the poor has widened in pair with income inequality. Re-
gardless of the reason given, happiness is nowadays more a commodity of rich people than it was
thirty-five years ago. Analysis of patterns in European countries confirm the crucial role of income
inequality in the conversion of economic growth into aggregate well-being. The increased well-
being gap between the rich and poor has widened in other developed countries. It appears that
this fact should receive additional attention and be consider as a stylized fact of the relationship
between income and happiness. Correcting for taxes has little effect on the estimated slope of the
happiness function and using permanent rather than transitory income surprisingly lowers the
gradient.
The conclusions reached in this paper extend naturally to those reached in other fields of eco-
nomics: income equality matters. Whether it is because people compare themselves to each other
or because the happiness function is concave, the income distribution affects how resources are
converted into well-being. Raising national happiness with policies aimed at accelerating the eco-
nomic development of a country is not ineffective if the expansion benefits the entire income dis-
tribution.
On a theoretical level, economists understand how utility relates to income. Bridging the gap
between theory and practice can be a difficult task as utility per se is not measurable. Economists
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have partly resolved this issue by studying peoples’ choices but choices are only informative of
preferences; they do not allow for comparisons across individuals. For many, this is precisely the
appeal of happiness data. This paper attempts to inform the debate about the relationship between
happiness and utility by exploring an alternative interpretation of the stylized facts of happiness
research.
More work is needed before economists can clearly understand the relationship between sub-
jective well-being and utility. Few studies have investigated the production of happiness. An
agent’s time allocation is paramount to his welfare. Furthermore, knowing that time is an impor-




Lagged income (Yt−1) can be used as a proxy for permanent income (Y Pt ). Under the permanent
income hypothesis, observed income (Yt) has a permanent (Y Pt ) and transitory (Y Tt ) component.
A consumers’ utility depends on permanent income.
Yt = Y Tt + Y
P
t
Yt−1 = Y Tt−1 + Y
P
t−1
The correlation between Yt and Ht does not isolate the effect of permanent income on happiness.
However, if income follows a random walk, the only part of lagged income related to contempo-
raneous well-being is the permanent part, it can thus serve as a proxy for Y Pt .
Cov(Y Pt−1, Y
P





















Figure 3.1: Economic Growth and Falling Average Happiness.
Note: The Figure illustrates the happiness of two individuals, with the same concave utility function,
who’s happiness changes across two periods as a result of changes in their income. The result



































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.4: The Well-Being Function US Health and Retirement Study (B).
(a) Feeling Sad (b) Feeling Sad/log
(c) Enjoy Life (d) Enjoy Life/log
(e) Feeling Depressed (f) Feeling Depressed/log
Note: Figure displays the coefficients of an ordered probit regression of well-being on income-
group-year dummies.
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Figure 3.5: The Well-Being Function in West Germany.
(a) Life Satisfaction (GSOEP) (b) Life Satisfaction/log (GSOEP)
(c) Life Satisfaction (EB) (d) Life Satisfaction/log (EB)
(e) Happiness (EB) (f) Happiness/log (EB)































































































































































































































Figure 3.8: Curvature Profile for Different λ.
(a) Linear Scale
(b) log Scale
Note: Figure shows the effect of λ on y = (xλ − 1)/λ on a linear and a log scale.
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Figure 3.9: Incomes of the Quintiles in the US.
(a) Real Income
(b) Happiness
Note: Figure shows the trajectories of Real income and Happiness for each quitiles.
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Figure 3.10: Evolution of the Distribution of Answers for Each Income Quintile of the GSS (US)
(a) Bottom Quintile (b) 2nd Quintile
(c) 3rd Quintile (d) 4th Quintile
(e) Top Quintile
Note: Figure shows the % of respondent choosing each answer over time for each quitiles.
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Table 3.1: Well-being Questions from Different Data Sources.
General Social Survey
“Taken all together, how would you say things are these days would you say that you are:”
1. Very Happy 2. Pretty Happy 3. Not too Happy
Health and Retirement Study
“Now think about the past week and the feelings you have experienced. Please tell me if
each of the following was true for you much of the time this past week.”
Felt depressed / Was happy / Felt sad / Enjoyed life.
Eurobarometer
Happiness
“Taking all things together, how would you say things are these days - would you say you’re: ”
1. Very Happy 2. Pretty Happy 3. Not too Happy
Life Satisfaction
“Please tell me whether you are with your life in general?”
1. Very satisfied 2. Fairly satisfied 3. Not very satisfied 4. Not at all satisfied
German Socio Economic Panel
“In conclusion, we would like to ask you about your satisfaction with your life in general.”
0. Completely dissatisfied (...) 10. Completely satisfied
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Table 3.2: Income Questions from Different Data Sources.
German Socio Economic Panel
“If you take a look at the total income from all members of the household: how high is the
monthly household income today?” Please state the net monthly income, which means
after deductions for taxes and social security. Please include regular income such as pensions,
housing allowance, child allowance, grants for higher education support payments, etc.”
Health and Retirement Study
The income variable, HwITOT, is the sum of all income in household, that is, the sum of the
respondent and his spouse earned income, capital gains income, pension and annuities, Social
Security payments, unemployment and worker’s compensation, income from Veteran’s benefits,
welfare, and food stamps, alimony, other income, lump sums from insurance, pension and
inheritance.”
The information from each item is obtain from unfolding bracket questions.
Eurobarometer
“Please count the total wages and salaries per month of all members of this households,
all pensions and social benefits; child allowance and any other income like rents, etc...
Please indicate the letter of the income group your household falls into before tax and .
other deductions.”
A. Under $10,000 per year ... F. $70,000 and over per year
General Social Survey
“In which of these groups did your total family income, from all sources, fall last year
before taxes, that is? Just tell me the letter.”
A. Under $1,000 ... Y. $150,000 or over
Table 3.3: The Well-Being Function in the US.
SWB measure λ1 Smallest β̂Top β̂Full Income Source
top %2
Happiness 0.5143 90th 0.393 0.238 Pre-Tax GSS
(0.049) (0.083) (0.007)
Happiness 0.6112 90th 0.430 0.262 Net GSS
(0.055) (0.078) (0.007)
Feeling Happy -0.0117 60th 0.040 0.171 Net HRS
(0.0012) (0.015) (0.005)
Enjoy Life -0.0070 60th 0.059 0.170 Net HRS
(0.0012) (0.018) (0.005)
Feeling Sad 0.0116 70th 0.050 0.204 Net HRS
(0.0012) (0.014) (0.004)
Feeling Depressed 0.0594 95th 0.106 0.280 Net HRS
(0.0009) (0.037) (0.005)
CUmulative Score 0.0181 95th 0.106 0.280 Net HRS
(0.0010) (0.037) (0.005)
1 λ provides the best fit for SWBit = (yλit − 1)/λ, where y is income.
2 The table reports the smallest group at the top of the income distribution within
which ln(income) is significantly associated with well-being. The coefficients estimated
within the group and with the full sample including demographic controls.
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Table 3.4: Curvature Estimates of the Happiness Function for Europe.
λ̂LS λ̂H Income N̄ Time Span Source
France 0.4772 = 0.4480 Pre-Tax 291 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1012) (0.1334)
Belgium 0.1221 < 0.2667 Pre-Tax 278 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1318) (0.2062)
Netherlands 0.9894 > 0.2366 Pre-Tax 310 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1338) (0.2520)
Germany-West 0.4941 > 0.3603 Pre-Tax 291 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1195) (0.1644)
Italy 0.2209 > -0.0391 Pre-Tax 291 1975-02/86 EB
(0.0851) (0.1418)
Denmark 0.9157 > 0.1013 Pre-Tax 246 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1462) (0.2135)
Ireland 1.3234 > 0.2555 Pre-Tax 272 1975-02/86 EB
(0.2201) (0.2352)
Great Britain 0.4980 > -0.1916 Pre-Tax 300 1975-02/86 EB
(0.1039) (0.2169)
Greece 0.1014 = 0.0886 Pre-Tax 255 1975-02/86 EB
(0.0765) (0.2094)
Germany-West -0.1531 Net 2,788 1984-05 GSOEP
(0.4362 )
1 The estimation finds λ that provides the best fit for SWBit = (yλit − 1)/λ,
where y is income.
The =, > and < signs indicate how the coefficient statistically relate to each other.
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Table 3.5: Satiation test of the Well-Being Function for Europe.
Country Smallest β̂ β̂ Smallest β̂ β̂
top %1 top Full Sample top %1 top Full Sample
Happiness Life Satisfaction
France 80th 0.387 0.371 80th 0.561 0.338
(0.087) (0.017) (0.068) (0.010)
Belgium 90th 0.495 0.347 90th 0.221 0.154
(0.181) (0.019) (0.083) (0.011)
Netherlands 70th 0.297 0.316 90th 0.693 0.349
(0.097) (0.020) (0.161) (0.011)
Italy 70th 0.210 0.397 90th 0.556 0.420
(0.079) (0.020) (0.070) (0.011)
Luxembourg 70th 0.287 0.328 80th 0.351 0.388
(0.139) (0.039) (0.122) (0.020)
Denmark 50th 0.125 0.097 90th 0.478 0.201
(0.048) (0.013) (0.124) (0.008)
Ireland 60th 0.166 0.190 90th 0.179 0.223
(0.072) (0.020) (0.081) (0.012)
Great-Britain 60th 0.231 0.154 90th 0.206 0.259
(0.053) (0.015) (0.106) (0.008)
Greece 70th 0.152 0.176 90th 0.187 0.3053
(0.069) (0.022) (0.062) (0.010)
Germany 70th 0.338 0.457 80th 0.444 0.440
(0.130) (0.025) (0.099) (0.012)
Germany GSOEP 95th 0.206 0.254
(0.068) (0.028)
1 The table reports the smallest group at the top of the income distribution
within which ln(income) is significantly associated with well-being. The coefficients
estimated within the group and with the full sample are reported.
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Table 3.6: Trends in the Rich-Poor Gap in the US (GSS).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Poor -0.5780*** -0.4648*** -0.1834*** -0.6018***
(0.0374) (0.0385) (0.0469) (0.0388)
Mid -0.2377*** -0.2310*** -0.0873*** -0.2173***
(0.0319) (0.0321) (0.0336) (0.0322)
Poor Time Trend -0.0038*** 0.0008 -0.0025** -0.0044***
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0012)
Middle Time Trend -0.0021*** 0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0039***
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Rich Time Trend 0.0016 0.0029** 0.0011 -0.0001
(0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015)
ln(RealIncome) 0.1745***
(0.0124)
Controls1 No Yes No Yes
Education2 No No No Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0174 0.0418 0.0203 0.0219
N 41795 41727 41795 41631
1 Controls include the respondent’s age, its square, its ethnicity
(black, white or other) and his marital status.
2 Education is accounted for by the highest degree achieved
(Less then High-School, High-School, Bachelor or Graduate).
Table 3.7: Individual Income and Happiness in the US and Germany.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln(Income) 0.1465***
(0.0079)




Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls 1 Yes Yes Yes No Yes
(Pseudo)R2 0.0450 0.0450 0.0107 0.0155 0.0083
Fixed Effects No No No Yes2 No
N 41727 41635 60714 61169 57934
Source GSS GSS GSOEP GSOEP GSOEP
1 Controls include age, age2, marital status, gender, race and education.
2 Linear regression, SWB score converted with a linear scheme (Very Satisfied=10




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.9: Life Satisfaction and Income Inequality trends in Europe (EB-B).
UK Greece Spain Portugal
Poor -0.6579*** -0.4970*** -0.6809*** 0.1101
(0.0457) (0.0566) (0.1737) (0.0853)
Mid -0.2736*** -0.2150*** -0.5988*** 0.1009
(0.0391) (0.0487) (0.1641) (0.0788)
Poor × Time 0.0012 -0.0049** -0.0010 -0.0138***
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0034) (0.0025)
Middle× Time 0.0061*** -0.0024* 0.0118*** 0.0023
(0.0010) (0.0013) (0.0019) (0.0020)
Rich× Time 0.0091*** -0.0004 -0.0157 0.0197***
(0.0030) (0.0025) (0.0100) (0.0039)
Controls1 Yes Yes Yes Yes
PseudoR2 0.0231 0.0157 0.0127 0.0257
N 35046 30515 18733 25544
LS Gap ↑ ↓ ↔ ↑
Inc Inequality ↑ ↓ ↓ ↑
1 Controls include age, age2, marital status, gender, race and education.




Avg ln(Income) 0.0956*** 0.0789***
(0.0174) (0.0261)
β0 -2.1920*** -1.5655*** -1.8560***
(0.3928) (0.2142) (0.4024)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
F 21.0578 30.1479 15.4218
N 270 270 270
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CHAPTER IV
Time, Gender and Happiness
4.1 Introduction
The decline in the happiness of American women over the last forty years has recently been
added to the list of puzzling facts about happiness [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008b)]. Although the
gender happiness gap favored women in the mid-seventiesthe gap had reversed by the mid-two-
thousands. Figure 4.1 illustrates this phenomenon in the US; the data is from the General Social
Survey. In many regards, the lives of women have improved over the last decades. The women’s
right movement, the increased availability of oral contraceptive, the fall in the male-female wage
gap, the rise in women’s educational attaintment and their increased participation in the labor
market have all contributed to this. As Stevenson and Wolfers argue (2008), the reversal of the
gender happiness gap “rise(s) provocative questions about (...) the legitimacy of using subjective
well-being to assess broad social changes.”.
The primary goals of this paper are to propose a taxonomy for interpreting empirical analysis in
the field of happiness research and to document how happiness differs between men and women.
The secondary objective is to test the possibility that gender differences can account for the reversal
of the happiness gap. This paper studies three dimensions along which men and women differ
in terms of happiness: the life cycle, the effect of time spent working and the effect of labor force
status.
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The paper starts by describing a general taxonomy to think about happiness research. It builds
on the notion that happiness is a good and thus responds to changes in relative prices. I argue
that happiness regressions should be thought of as production functions; the inputs of which
are time and income. As identified in the literature, the happiness function has an adaptative
component and reacts to status effects. The model described provides a framework for interpreting
the findings of the present paper and identifies areas of the literature where further work would
be especially beneficial.
The paper then documents the evolution of the gender happiness gap in different surveys,
highlighting the fact that the decline in female happiness is not observed in panels. As this raises
a concern for compositional effects, the paper proceeds to examine the life cycle of happiness. The
happiness of men and women follow very different trajectories over the life cycle. Given that the
average respondent’s age has increased differently for men and women in the GSS, the decline in
the happiness of American women could be due to a change in the composition of the sample. As
the paper shows, controlling for age effects actually widens the happiness gap.
The paper goes on to measure the importance of time allocation to investigate the possibility
that the decline in women’s happiness is due to gender differences in the evolution of the cost of
happiness. The argument builds on the price theoretic approach of Kimball and Willis and argues
that the relative cost of happiness has increased more for women than for men since the mid-
seventies [Kimball and Willis(2005)]. The analysis looks at the impact of weekly hours of work
on happiness and finds evidence that time spent working has a favorable effect on happiness; this
effect is smaller for women. This is interpreted as evidence that time spent working is not a proper
proxy for time not invested in the production of happiness because work is an important source of
social interaction a key input in the happiness production function. The analysis, thus rejects the
idea that gender differences in the evolution of weekly work hours explain the relative decline in
female happiness. As the paper shows, the decline of female happiness is more prevalent among
employed women.
Finally, the paper examines the importance of work status. Work status indicators are inter-
preted as proxies for patterns of time allocation. Formal analysis confirms that unemployment is
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detrimental to happiness and shows that the effect is smaller for women. Somewhat surprisingly,
the paper shows that full-time employment has only a small effect on happiness. Furthermore,
part-time employment is negatively associated with men’s happiness, but not with women’s. I
argue that these patterns are consistent with the idea that work takes time away from other activi-
ties that raise women’s happiness and discuss how research should proceed to further explore this
idea.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 explores what it means to con-
sider happiness as a good for empirical research. Section 4.3 describes the data used throughout
the paper. Section 4.4 presents the results and interpretation of the analysis. It is divided into three
subsections focusing each on the different dimensions. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Happiness is a Good
Kimball and Willis argue that happiness, like health or entertainment, is a higher-order good
[Kimball and Willis(2005)]. Base-line mood, or long-run happiness, cannot be purchased in mar-
kets but can be produced in the household using time and tradable inputs. Consequently, ag-
gregate changes in happiness, or the lack thereof, reflect changes in consumption patterns. Con-
ceiving happiness as a good does not deny a role for subjective well-being in economics. Peo-
ples’ ability to consume happiness is an important indicator of their welfare. Understanding how
happiness is produced is important for the same reasons that understanding the determinants of
health is. More importantly, departing from the assumption of equivalence between happiness
and utility, and recognizing that happiness is a good, highlights the fact that most empirical anal-
yses of well-being do not account for the cost of happiness and the time-intensive nature of its
production.
The production of happiness is time-intensive; it requires time spent with friends and family
or more generally, time spent interacting with others [Elizabeth W. Dunn and Norton(2008)]. The
availability of time is thus a major component of the cost of happiness. Because they affect the
trade-offs between different uses of time, socioeconomic changes such as changes in the wage
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gender-gap affect the demand for happiness.
The price theoretic approach to happiness suggests a simple explanation to the decline in
women’s happiness: compared to that of men, the cost of happiness has risen since the mid-
seventies for women. Women’s consumption of happiness has fallen despite important improve-
ments in their lives because the number of sacrifices they have to make for their happiness has
increased along with these other changes in their lives. This is not to say that the changes in
women’s circumstances have left them worse-off. Rather, it has allowed them to reallocate re-
sources from happiness towards other goods. This paper looks for evidence of this interpretation
by investigating the effects of time spent working and work status the happiness of men and
women.
Although there exists no explicit empirical investigation of the link between time allocation
and happiness, many have investigated the importance of unemployment. Clark and Oswald
find that joblessness depresses well-being more than any other personal characteristic and that
the effect on happiness is diminished if one lives in a region with high unemployment [Clark
and Oswald(1994)] [Clark(2003)]. Using panel data, Winkelman and Winkelman argue that the
non-pecuniary effects of unemployment are much larger than the effect that stems from the as-
sociated loss of income [Winkelmann and Winkelmann(1998)]. Blancheflower and Oswald find
that unemployment hits men harder than women and that it would take about $60,000 per year to
compensate a man for unemployment [Blanchflower and Oswald(1999)]1. Alternatively, Dockery
finds that having a job that provides low job satisfaction has an even greater detrimental effect on
well-being than being unemployed [Dockery(2005)].
To formalize the intuition presented in this section, consider the following model. An agent
must decide how best to allocate her time and resources across a consumption good, happiness










st : T = k + l +m(4.2)
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where c is the agent’s consumption of the commodity good the price of which is one dollar per
unit, h is her happiness and l is her leisure. Each period, the agent has a limited amount of time
available (T ) to produce happiness (k), earn income (m) and enjoy leisure (l). For simplicity I
assume that U(·) is additively separable in its arguments. The agent can work as many hours as
she pleases, up to T , earning W for each m unit of time she works.
H(k, c,X) is the happiness production function. Output (H) depends on the amount of time
(k) the agent spends producing happiness, her consumption (c) and elements that are beyond her
control (X), such as her personality and the income of other agents.
Substituting the constraints into equation (1) recasts the agent’s problem as one of allocation of
time between wage earning (m), leisure (l) and happiness production (k). Note that, because the
agent’s problem is static, optimality implies that she consumes everything she earns.
max
k,m














(U ′C(·) + U ′H(·)H ′c)
= W(4.7)
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At the optimum the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and time devoted to happi-
ness are proportional to the marginal productivity of time devoted to happiness, i.e. the marginal
happiness of time (4.6). Also, the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and work is propor-
tional to the wage rate (4.7). Together with the time constraint (4.2), these conditions determine
k∗, l∗ and m∗. Alternatively, the equations can be rearranged to show that the marginal rate of
substitution between happiness and work is also proportional to the wage rate.
U ′H(·)H ′k(·)
(U ′C(·) + U ′H(·)H ′c)
= W(4.8)
Specifying the agent’s utility function would allow comparative statics of the effect of changes in
the parameters on time allocation and ultimately on the agent’s happiness. Nonetheless, some
intuition is readily apparent. Assuming that happiness is a normal and ordinary good really lim-
its the possible explanations of the decline in female happiness. Because women’s income has
increased over the period of interest, one of the few possible explanations is an increase in the
relative price of happiness. There are however complementary phenomenon that come from the
particular shape and mechanisms of the happiness production function contributing to the relative
decline of happiness consumption among women .
4.2.1 The Production Function of Happiness
By now, it should be clear that estimating the production function of happiness requires ac-
counting for, among other things, time invested in happiness and more generally, things that affect
the amount of time available. There is ample evidence in the happiness literature that suggests that
the production of happiness suffers from status effects (see Luttmer for example [Luttmer(2004)])
and that happiness adapts to income [DiTella and MacCulloch(2006)]. Consider the following
general form of the happiness production function.
H(·) = hk(Time) + hy(Income) + hs(Status) + ha(Adaptation) + βXf(X)(4.9)
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The happiness function has five components. First, it depends on time invested in happiness (hk);
this refers to the time the agent spends with his friends and family, i.e. time invested in positive
social interactions. Happiness also depends on the agent’s income (hy) in addition to his status
(hs), which is often captured by the average income of a reference group such as his community or
his neighborhood. The fourth component is adaptation (ha), the degree to which the agent adapts
to changing circumstances, as this has been shown to play a role in individual happiness. Finally,
happiness is influenced by the agent’s individual characteristics including his personality and age
(X).
Many have documented the importance of the last four components of the happiness function.
Few, however, have paid attention to its specific form. For example, it is unclear whether the
function is stable over time and life circumstances or if it is dynamic. Some have argued, for
example, that the decline in women’s happiness is the result of a change in the reference group
of women. This claim is empirically verifiable. Little work has been conducted to verify whether
different groups adapt at different paces or whether the speed of adaptation to changes varies
over the life cycle. Of course, the research agenda is largely constrained by the available data.
Nonetheless, it seems fair to claim that we know little about the actual shape of the happiness
function. Since virtually no work has attempted to find empirical evidence of the importance
of the time component, it is the focus of this paper. The analysis will show that the framework
presented here can be helpful in interpreting the results.
4.3 Data
The General Social Survey (GSS) is a repeated micro-level cross section of about 1600 Amer-
icans covering the years 1972 to 2006 (with some gaps). In each year that it was conducted, the
survey asked respondents the following question: “Taken all together, how would you say things
are these days; would you say that you are 1. Very Happy 2. Pretty Happy 3. Not too Happy?”.
The survey gathers information about numerous individual characteristics including age, gen-
der, ethnicity, marital status and education. Although no explicit questions about time invested
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in happiness, the GSS measures weekly work hours by asking all respondents how many hours
they worked in the previous week, at all jobs’ (variable hrs1) and respondents unemployed how
many hours a week they usually work, at all jobs (variable hrs2). In cases where the analysis is
broken down by cohorts, I use Bailey’s (2002) categorization presented in Table 4.1 [Bailey(2006)].
The GSS categorizes respondents by work status along different dimensions. Table 4.2 reports
the frequency of men and women in the categories relevant to the analysis, as well as the overall
frequency.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) is a bi-annual panel of roughly 22,000 retired Amer-
icans covering the years 1992 to 2004. The HRS’s subjective well-being measure comes from an-
swers to a subset of questions from the Center for Epidemiologic Studies of Depression (CES-D),
aimed at measuring depressive symptoms. One such questions asks: “Now think about the past
week and the feelings you have experienced. Please tell me if each of the following was true
(Yes/No) for you much of the time this past week? Much of the time during the past week you
have felt - sad, happy, depressed and enjoyed life”. A composite SWB score is obtained by sum-
ming the respondents answers to each question.2
The German Socio Economic Panel (GSOEP) is a yearly panel of about 2750 German adults;
it gathers detailed socioeconomic information as well as a life satisfaction measure over a period
ranging from 1984 to 2005. The survey poses the following question: “(...) we would like to ask you
about your satisfaction with your life in general. Would you say you are 1. Completely dissatisfied
... 10. Completely satisfied”. The survey gathers a wide range of socio-demographic questions,
among which is average weekly hours of work (tatzeit). The categories used to described the
respondents’ work status are also reported in Table 4.2.
4.4 Analysis
The analysis starts by documenting the decline in female happiness. Following Stevenson and
Wolfers (2009), a formal estimate of the time trend of the happiness gap is measured [Stevenson
2A weight is attributed to each answer based in the inverse of its frequency.
83
and Wolfers(2008b)]. Then the paper documents the differences between the genders and assesses
whether these differences can account for the decline in women’s happiness for each dimension
over which men and women happiness is studied. More precisely, effects on the time trend of the
gender happiness gap are quantified.
4.4.1 Declining Female Happiness
Figure 4.1 shows the happiness of male and female respondents of the GSS since 1975. Two
elements are apparent. Firstly, the decline in female happiness. Although it is somewhat volatile,
women’s happiness has a distinct negative trend over the three decades of the survey. While
women where happier than men in the mid-seventies, this gap reversed itself by the beginning of
the new millennium.
Table 4.3 formalizes this decline by estimating non-parametric estimates of the time trend. The
following equation is estimated.










β0 + +X ′βX + εit,(4.10)
where βW captures the difference between male and female happiness in 1972. βWT and βMT
represent the change in happiness per 100 years, the variable Time is the difference between the
respondent’s survey year and the first year of the survey. X is a vector of individual character-
istics which can include indicators for religion, an indicator for the presence of children at home,
indicators for educational achievement and indicators for marital status. An estimate of the trend
of the gender happiness gap is obtained by taking the difference between βMT and βWT ; a sig-
nificantly positive gap implies that men’s happiness is growing faster than women’s (or declining
at a slower rate). Tables 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 report these estimated for the full sample of the GSS,
the white respondents of the GSS, the GSOEP and the HRS. The GSS estimates are obtained with
ordered probits and the full sample of the GSOEP and the full sample of the HRS are obtained
using linear regression with fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the year level for all of
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the models.
To make the interpretation of the tables explicit, column (1) of Table 4.3 is interpreted in greater
detail. According to the estimates, the difference between male and female happiness in 1972 was
about 7% of one standard deviation (0.0734). Computing the corresponding gender gap for the
last year of the survey, 2006 suggests a reversed gender gap of 5% of one standard deviation.3 The
gap has grown by about 12% of a standard deviation over the 35 years of the survey. To give an
idea of the magnitude of this change, observe that doubling the income of the average respondent
has a comparable effect.4
Column (1) of each table reports the estimates obtained without controls. In all of the data
sources, the positive coefficient on Women confirms that women have generally reported higher
levels of happiness. Comparing the estimates from Table 4.3 and 4.4 highlights, as Stevenson and
Wolfers identified, that the decline in female happiness is more pronounced among the white pop-
ulation [Stevenson and Wolfers(2008b)]. In fact, for the full sample, the inclusion of the controls,
column (2), and personal income, column (3), renders the time trend of female happiness insignif-
icant.
Column (1) of Table 4.5 shows no evidence of a relative decline in female happiness in Ger-
many. As the βWT and βMT estimates show, this is because male and female happiness decline at
similar rates. The inclusion of controls (2) and personal income (3) do not significantly alter this
result. Table 4.6 presents the same analysis for retired Americans (HRS); the period covered by the
survey is shorter and more recent. This could explain the fact that the inclusion of controls (2) and
personal income (3) render the time trend of the gender gap insignificant.
The fact that no significant time trend is identified for the gender gap in the panels raises the
concern that the decline in happiness could results from the changing composition of the GSS
over the relevant years. Of particular concern are changes in the prevalence of the cohorts and age
groups.
Figure 4.2 reports the happiness of each cohort by gender over time. Although the absolute
3The gender gap in 2006 is obtained by computing β̂W + (2006− 1972)/100× β̂WT − (2006− 1972)/100× β̂MT .
4Column (3) of Table 1 estimates the coefficient on log(Income) to about 0.13.
85
decline in happiness is most apparent for the older cohorts, the relative decline is evident for
all cohorts. This could suggest that the absolute decline of female happiness is a phenomena of
the older cohorts. Because the younger cohorts are observed only during their younger age, it is
important to verify whether life-cycle effects are also at play.
4.4.2 Happiness over the Life Cycle
Figure 4.3 shows the happiness of male and female respondents over the life-cycle for all three
surveys. The dashed line shows well-being as predicted by a regression of well-being on age and
a quartic in age interacted with gender.
The figure clearly shows different patterns for male and female. As illustrated by figure (a)
and (b), young women tend to be happier then men and their happiness increases until the late
twenties after which it starts to decline steadily until the late fifties. For the remainder of the life
cycle, female happiness is somewhat volatile but the overall trend is negative. Men happiness
increases until the early thirties and is roughly stable until retirement. Male and female happiness
roughly track one another during the period of active labor participation, but diverge around the
age of sixty-five. Male happiness increase at retirement such that the happiness of each gender
spread onward.
Figure 4.4 shows the happiness life cycle patterns of men and women for each cohort in the
GSS. The trends identified with the entire sample are observable within each cohort, suggesting
that it is not necessary to make distinctions between the cohorts in the econometric analysis. The
following equation is thus estimated to formalize the life cycle trends.
Hit = β0 + βW (Womeni) + βWA1(Womeni ×Agei) + βMA1(Meni ×Agei)
+βWA2(Womeni ×Age2i ) + βMA2(Meni ×Age2i ) +X ′βX + εi,(4.11)
where βWA1 and βMA1 capture the linear effect of age on female and male well-being and βWA1
and βMA1 captures the quadratic effect of age. Column (4) of Table 4.3 to 4.6 report the correspond-
86
ing estimates.
In the GSS, female happiness follows an inverse “u-shape” over the life cycle, peaking in the
late forties (βWA1/βWA2). The coefficients indicate that men’s happiness rises steadily with age, al-
though at a declining rate. Said differently, the estimated happiness peak (βMA1/βMA2) is beyond
the average male life expectancy. The “u-shape” life cycle pattern of happiness identified by some
authors in the GSS would be observed if the data was not broken down by gender [Blanchflower
and Oswald(1999)]. Easterlin attributes this incorrect description of the life cycle to the failure to
account for age-period-cohort effects but the pattern of diverging gender happiness emerges even
without such controls [MArcelli and Easterlin(2005)].
The patterns estimated in the GSOEP panel are somewhat different. Here, happiness follows a
“u-shape” for both genders. Female happiness falls at a declining rate over life, reaching the bot-
tom beyond the living age. Male happiness rises until the late forties and subsequently declines.
As the respondents are much older, the patterns suggested by the HRS data describe the evolution
of happiness in the latter days of the life cycle. As with the GSS, the estimates suggest that happi-
ness follows an inverse “u-shape”. In the case at hand, happiness peaks at around retirement age
for men (65 years of age) and in the mid-fifties for women.
As is apparent from panel (b) of Figure 4.6, the average age in the GSS has increased steadily
since the beginning of the survey. More importantly, it has increased at different rates for men and
women. To account for the potential effect of the changing age composition and the different time
path of happiness over the life-cycle for each gender, Equations 4.10 and 4.11 are estimated jointly.
Column (5) of Tables 4.3 and 4.4 look at the effect of age, as accounted for with the gender-
age-age-square specification. The inclusion of the gender-age-age-square variables does not affect
the estimated time trend of the gender happiness gap for either the full-sample or the white sub-
sample5. This, however, could be due to the fact that the quality of the fit of this specification
over the working years (where the most of the mass of the respondents is concentrated) is poor, as
shown by Figure 4.5. Column (6) verifies this possibility by accounting for life cycle effects with
5This specification are not estimated with the panels as the Age and Age2 variables interacted with the gender variable
are perfectly collinear with the fixed effects.
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the inclusion of Age × Gender dummy variables. As the results show this does not significantly
affect the gender happiness gap in any of the surveys.
The life cycle patterns identified in all three surveys confirm the fact that happiness of men
and women follow very different trajectories over the life cycle. Also interesting is the fact that
happiness tends to be falling over the years of active labor participation for both genders. This
initial finding is consistent with the notion that work takes time away form happiness described
in Section 4.2. Consequently, the following section explores the effects of time spent working and
work status on happiness.
4.4.3 Work
Figure 4.7 presents the proportion of respondents of each sex that report being employed and
the corresponding average weekly hours of work. The gender difference shows a drastic decline
for both variables. Women’s average employment and hours of work have increased at a faster
rate than men’s over the last decades. Note that these changes have left the gender income gap
roughly stable (panel (a) of Figure 4.6).
Work hours
Figure 4.8 illustrates the evolution of the average number of hours of work per week by em-
ployment status for men and women. Hours of work have followed similar trajectories for male
and female full-time workers. This is not the case for part-time workers where the average number
of work hours has remained roughly stable for men but increased drastically for women. Stated
differently, the change in work hours is only a gender specific factor among part-time workers.
To formalize the effect of time spent working on happiness and the gender gap, weekly work
hours and its square are added to Equation 4.10. Tables 4.7, 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 report the correspond-
ing estimates for each sub-sample/survey.
Column (1) of each table is reported to allow comparisons. Column (2) includes the number
of hours worked. Nowhere does weekly work hours have the predicted negative effect on hap-
piness. The effect is insignificant among retired workers (HRS) and positive among the working
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population of the US (GSS) and Germany (GSOEP). Happiness calculus suggests, for example, that
among German workers, 10 hours of work has the same beneficial effect on happiness as a 16.5%
increase in income (10 × 0.0034/0.2059, column (2), Table 4.9). Column (3) includes a quartic in
weekly work hours to investigate the possibility that the beneficial effects of time spent working
diminish over time. Such effects are only identified in the GSOEP and suggest that the optimal
length of a work week is approximately 80 hours (βHrs2/βHrs). Neither the linear nor concave
specification of weekly work hours lowers the time trend of the happiness gender gap in the GSS.
To allow for the possibility that the effects on well-being of time spent working are different
for men and women, column (4) includes an interaction term between work hours and a gender
indicator. The net effect of work hours for female respondents can thus be obtained by looking at
the sum of the coefficient on work hours and the interaction term. Among the working population
(GSS and GSOEP), the interaction coefficient is negative and statistically significant. In the GSS,
the assumption that the net effect of work hours on women’s happiness is nil cannot be rejected
(t = 1.27 in the full sample and t = 1.51 in the white sub-sample). The same test in the GSOEP
identifies a barely significant effect (t = 1.78). This difference between men and women does not
explain the decline in women’s happiness as the estimates of the gap remain roughly unaffected
by the inclusion of these extra terms.
To the extent that weekly work hours is a proper proxy for time taken away from happiness,
the fact that its effect on happiness is positive is rather surprising. To understand why this could
be the case, I turn to Equation 4.9. The assumption behind the hypothesis that time spent working
will lower happiness is that it lowers the amount of time spent producing happiness, the hk com-
ponent of the production function. It is possible, however, that work hours actually increases time
invested in happiness. Specifically, if part of the agent’s job involves positive social interactions
with co-workers or clients, time spent working will have a positive effect on happiness. Better
data on the job characteristics of the respondents would allow for further exploration of this pos-
sibility. Unfortunately such data is not presented in the available surveys. It is also possible that
work hours have a positive effect on the agent’s status, hs. Of course, it seems more likely that it
is the type of work rather then the length of the work week that matters for a respondent’s status,
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but since the former is not included in the regression, work hours could capture status effects.
Until the characteristics of the respondent’s work are controlled for or the relationship between
the length of one’s work week and these characteristics are better understood, the implication
of the results reported here imply about the price theoretic approach to happiness will remain
unclear. In the meantime, it seems relevant to stress that evidence of the gender differential effects
of time allocation for happiness are apparent in the data. As it appears that men and women
experience labor force participation differently, the next section investigates the importance of
work status for the well-being of each gender.
Work Status
Figure 4.9 shows the evolution of happiness by work status for each gender. Not surprisingly,
unemployed respondents are the least happy group among both men and women. Men who work
full-time are happier than those who work part-time. Interestingly, this is not the case with women;
women who work part-time are generally happier than full-time counterparts. Figure 4.10 reports
the evolution of the happiness gap for each employment group. As the figures suggest, the gen-
der happiness gap has followed different trajectories among each group. The difference between
female and male happiness has increased for full-time workers, remained somewhat constant for
part-time workers and decreased for the unemployed. In other words, the figures suggests that
the decline in female happiness appears to be a phenomenon of the fully employed.
Columns (5), (6), (7) and (8) of Tables 4.7 through 4.9 quantify the evolution of the gender
happiness gap within work status groups. The analysis shows no evidence of difference by work
status in the panels but confirms that, in the GSS, the relative decline of female happiness is only
observed among the working population, more precisely among full-time workers. Consequently,
for the full-sample and the white sub-sample, the time trend in the gender happiness gap is larger
when the analysis is limited to fully employed respondents. Among the white respondents, the
time trend is 0.5017 for all work statuses and 0.7434 for the fully-employed. The gender happi-
ness gap shows no significant time trend among the partly-employed, the unemployed and the
respondents reporting to be “keeping house”. The estimated gaps in the HRS and GSEOP remain
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insignificant in each work status sub-sample.
One interpretation of the fact that the relative decline in women’s happiness is concentrated
among the fully-employed is that status effects are dynamic. Where the formation of the reference
group depends on the agent’s work status, increased participation in the labor market would have
a negative effect on women’s well-being. It is possible that fully-employed women are more likely
to include fully-employed men in their reference groups than other women are. This hypothesis
is empirically verifiable cannot be tested with the GSS. Previous work has shown that people
make comparisons with others that are geographically close to them; unfortunately, in the GSS,
information regarding the respondents’ location is too broadly defined to be useful [Barrington-
Leigh and Helliwell(2008)].
To further explore the importance of work status, Equation 4.10 is augmented with work status
indicators and gender interaction terms. Table 4.11 reports the results, with corresponding effects
on the gender gap. The analysis focuses solely on the GSS and the GSOEP as the HRS does not
provide much variance in the respondents work status. Column (1), (3) and (5) include the bench-
mark regressions from the full sample of the GSS, the white sub-sample of the GSS and the full
sample of the GSOEP, respectively.
In the GSS the analysis reveals similar patterns for the full sample and the white sub-sample,
columns (2) and (4). As expected, unemployment has a large negative effect on happiness. The
relative magnitude of the unemployment coefficient (-0.4126) compared to the income coefficient
(0.1469) is what has led others to the conclusion that the monetary cost of job loss are smaller than
the psychological costs [Winkelmann and Winkelmann(1998)]. Full time employment is positively
associated with well-being; the effect, however, is not significant in the white sub-sample. It should
be noted that the coefficient is relatively small compared to the effect of unemployment (0.0404).
Interestingly, part-time employment has a negative effect on well-being (-0.0887).
The genders differ on two levels. First, part-time work does not have a negative effect on
female happiness (the net effect is not statistically significant, −0.0887 + 0.1261 = 0.0374). Also,
the effect of unemployment is lower for women than for men. These patterns are in line with
the notion that work takes time away from a woman’s production of happiness or that it does so
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differently than for men.
The results from the GSOEP are somewhat different but confirm the presence of clear gender
differences. Here too, the effect of unemployment on well-being is undeniably negative (-0.2380).
Furthermore, as is the case with the GSS, this effect is dampened if the respondent is a women.
In fact, the analysis suggests that unemployment has no effect on female happiness (−02380 +
0.2066 = 0.0314). Full time employment is not associated with male or female life satisfaction.
Contrary to what is identified in the GSS, part-time work increases well-being for men, but has
no effect on women (0.2175 − 0.2292 = −0.0117). In the GSOEP, only 6% of the respondent are
women who work part time ; that category of work status is vastly dominated by men. The GSOEP
sample consists of about 20% community service workers, about 70% of whom are women. The
effect of being in community service is negative for men (-0.2016), but the net effect on women is
nil (−0.2016 + 0.2529 = 0.0513).
Labor force status has gender specific effects on happiness. There is evidence that women ex-
perience job loss with less hardship than men do, suggesting either that the status loss is smaller
for them or that the loss of positive social interactions that accompany unemployment is less im-
portant for women. It could be, for example, that they maintain contact with ex-coworkers or that
they had less contact with them to begin with. In both surveys, the overall pattern is that work
status matters much less for the well-being of women than it does for that of men. This holds true
when controlling for personal characteristics and personal income. The simplest interpretation is
that the happiness functions of men and women are different. Of course, as explained earlier, it
is hazardous to make such inferences until further analysis that account for the characteristics of
the work are conducted. Still, the notion that happiness is a time-intensive good to produce is
consistent with the empirical findings presented here.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a framework for thinking about happiness research and documents gen-
der differences between male and female happiness. In parallel, the paper investigates the possi-
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bility that gender specific factors explain the decline of female happiness since the mid-seventies.
The framework presented in the paper builds on the notion that happiness is a good. This
idea stresses the importance of time allocation for personal happiness. The model also includes
other consensual findings about happiness, such as the importance of personal income, adaptation
and status effects. The discussion highlights productive areas for further research, including the
formation of reference groups and their effect on happiness.
The paper starts by describing the decline in female happiness for different sub-samples and
shows that there is no evidence of the decline in women’s well-being in the GSOEP and the HRS,
both of which are panels. The life cycle of male and female well-being are very different. Women
tend to be happier than men at a young age but the opposite is true after retirement. Gender
differences with regards to the well-being effects of time spent working and work status are also
documented. None of the gender specific factors described in the analysis account for the rever-
sal of the gender happiness gap in the US, but the results are interpreted as evidence that time
allocation is an important factor for personal well-being.
Economists are still uncertain about what they can learn from happiness research. The decline
of female happiness since the mid-seventies challenges the assumption of equivalence between
well-being and utility: every piece of evidence suggests that the opportunities available to women
have increased over this period yet their happiness has fallen. This paper attempts to demon-
strate that the conception of happiness as a good and a time-intensive commodity to produce can
potentially reconcile the inconsistency.
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Figure 4.1: Happiness by Gender over Time in the US (GSS).
The happiness scores are the coefficients from an ordered probit regression of happiness on Y ear ×Gender


















































































































































































Figure 4.6: Average Respondent Income and Age Over Time by Gender (GSS).
(a) Log(Income)
(b) Age over Time
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Table 4.1: Categorization of the Cohorts.
DOB Cohort
≤ 1921 Grand-Parents of Boomers
1921 - 1939 Parents of Boomers
1940 - 1945 Parents of Gen X
1946 - 1952 Early Boomers
1953 - 1958 Mid-Boomers
1959 - 1965 Late Boomers
1966 - 1975 Generation X
1976 - 1988 Children of Boomers
Table 4.2: Proportion of Men and Women by Work Status in the GSS and GSOEP.
GSS GSOEP
Men Women Sample Men Women Sample
Full T ime 56.3% 43.7% 49.73% 72.21% 27.79% 46.09%
Part T ime 31.2% 68.8% 10.14% 6.66% 93.34% 7.82%
Unemployed 65.1% 34.9% 12.99% 33.87% 66.13% 17.02%
Keeping House 2.9% 97.1% 1.91%
Community Service 27.72% 72.28% 20.36%
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Table 4.3: Age and the Gender Happiness Gap in the US (GSS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(T) (TX) (TI) (A) (TA) (TAi)
Women 0.0734*** 0.1465*** 0.1661*** 0.1735*** 0.2222***
(0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0229) (0.0654) (0.0648)
Women× T ime -0.2978*** 0.0826 0.0052 -0.3141*** -0.0217
(0.1147) (0.1118) (0.1118) (0.1191) (0.1182)
Men× T ime 0.0679 0.4995*** 0.4457*** 0.0427 0.4556***











Gap 0.3657*** 0.4169*** 0.4405*** 0.3569** 0.4773***
(0.1374) (0.1280) (0.1290) (0.1419) (0.1344)
Gender ×Age No No No No No Yes
dummies
Controls No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 46303 46153 41707 46153 46153 46011
1 Controls include Race, Education, Marital Status, Children and Religion Indicators.
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Table 4.4: Age and the Gender Happiness Gap in the US among the White Population (GSS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(T) (TX) (TI) (A) (TA) (TAi)
Women 0.1082*** 0.1909*** 0.2050*** 0.2213*** 0.2669***
(0.0258) (0.0249) (0.0264) (0.0730) (0.0753)
Women× T ime -0.3627*** -0.1427 -0.1961* -0.3535*** -0.2168*
(0.1216) (0.1223) (0.1116) (0.1274) (0.1140)
Men× T ime 0.0344 0.3746*** 0.3056** -0.0018 0.3180***











Gap 0.3971*** 0.5173*** 0.5017*** 0.3517** 0.5348***
(0.1334) (0.1237) (0.1341) (0.1394) (0.1401)
Gender ×Age No No No No No Yes
dummies
Controls No Yes Yes No No Yes
N 38176 38176 34637 38067 38067 38067
1 Controls include Education, Marital Status and Children.
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Table 4.5: Age and the Gender Happiness Gap in Germany (GSOEP).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
(T) (TX) (TI) (A) (TAi)
Women× T ime -0.0323*** -0.0291*** -0.0291*** -0.0401**
(0.0024) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0186)
Men× T ime -0.0302*** -0.0292*** -0.0298*** -0.0303***











Gap 0.0021 -0.0001 -0.0007 0.0098
(0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0190)
Gender ×Age No No No No Yes
dummies
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
N 58394 57997 57997 57997 57997
1 Controls include Race, Education and Marital Status.
107
Table 4.6: Age and the Gender Happiness Gap amon Retired Americans (HRS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (6)
(T) (TX) (TI) (A) (TAi)
Women× T ime -0.0208*** -0.0157*** -0.0152*** -0.0086
(0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0146)
Men× T ime -0.0171*** -0.0150*** -0.0147*** 0.0003











Gap 0.0037** 0.0007 0.0004 0.0089 0.0089
(0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0205) (0.0205)
Gender ×Age No No No No Yes
dummies
Controls No Yes Yes No Yes
N 117935 113491 101999 101997 101997























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While vastly studied, there is no consensus as to what economists can learn form studying
happiness. Many show skepticism toward the alleged virtues of this new method. Among other
things, the concerns stem from the fact that subjective well-being measures are unreliable to the
extent that they are affected by things such as the weather and stimuli as insignificant as finding a
penny on a copy machine [Schwarz(1987)], [Schwarz and Clore(1983)]. The well-being approach
implicitly moves economists away from “what people do” toward “what people say”. The topic
is increasingly apparent in the top journals but the idea that it is a valuable method of measuring
individual welfare is far from consensual and the approach remains marginal. Alternatively, the
enthusiasm for happiness data comes in part from the potential it offers for measuring the effect
of non-traded goods on individual welfare and for tackling questions left unexplored due to lack
of data.
This dissertation provides a critical review of the literature and, in particular, of the assumption
of equivalence between subjective well-being and utility. Chapters II and III demonstrate the short-
comings of many of the interpretations of the Easterlin paradox and the existence of alternative
interpretations, less challenging to the received knowledge in economics. Chapter IV explores the
idea that well-being is a good and shows that this conjecture is consistent with the data.
Regardless of the amount of attention the field of happiness has received in recent years,
economists understanding of subjective well-being is in its early stage. It is unquestionably a
114
promising field, the findings of which could have large effects in a wide range of domains. That
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